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Chapter I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES POSTAL POLICY 1782-1883

The United States postal policy has always been a liberal one.
It has always emphasized the social and political, ratner than the
revenue producing possibilities of a government postal service.
Even in Great Brltian, long recognized for its liberal political
institutions, the profit produced by its postal system remained
the chief concern of the government until 1840.1
has not been an unmixed blessing.
new territories by

Such a policy

It facilitated the settling of

iaklng stage lines through sparsely settled

regions possible; it was an important factor in the rapid expan
sion of railroad and steamship lines; and in our own time it has
fostered air transportation.

Such a generous open-handed policy

on the part of Congress has quite naturally been accompanied by
abuses and frauds.
The basis of the American postal policy was first laid down in
the Articles of Confederation.

There Congress was given the power

"...of establishing and regulating post-offices from one state to
another, throughout the United States, and exacting such postages
on the papers passing through the same as may be requisite to de
fray the expenses of the said office."2
The first comprehensive law in pursuance of this power was en
acted on October 18, 1782.

It was an elaborate statute, and its

enactment marked the birth of the present United States postal
system.

This law provided that:

"Whereas the communication of intelligence with regularity and
dispatch from one part to another of these United States is essen
tially requisite to the safety as well as the commercial Interest
thereof, and the United States in Congress assembled being by the
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Articles of Confederation vested with the sole and exclusive right
and power of establishing and regulating postoffices throughout
all these United States; and whereas it became mecessary to revise
the several regulations heretofore made relating to the postoffice
and reduce to one act:
"Be it therefore ordained by the United States in Congress assem
bled, and it is hereby ordained by the authority of the same, that
a continued communication of posts throughout these United States
shall be established and maintained by and under the direction of
the postmaster general of these United States to extend to and
from the State of New Hampshire to the State of Georgia inclusive,
and to and from such other parts of the United States as from
time to time he shall judge necessary, or Congress shall direct."3
The Postmaster General under this act, was given the power to
superintend and direct all the various activities of the postoffice
department; to appoint an assistant and deputies; to station the
deputies and to fix their compensation within the maximum limit of
twenty percent of the amounts of postage collected in their various
departments.

He was also given the power to employ postriders,

messengers, and expresses, who were to carry the mail over each
route at least once a week.

The law provided exclusively for a

horseback service, and it made no provision for contracting for
the carrying of the mail.

These defects were remedied by an act

passed in 1784, which authorized the Postmaster General, if he
believed that the mails might be more economically carried, to
contract for the carrying of the mails either by stage or horse
back in the states of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, and Virginia.4

The object of the provision was to en

courage the establishment of stage lines in the states so desig
nated.
With the adoption of the Constitution, Congress was again dele
gated the power to establish post-offices and post-roads.3

This

-3

time there was no specific injunction that postages must be
exacted requisite to defray the expenses of the service.

It is

merely a general grant of power which Congress may exercise at
its discretion.
The press of more urgent matters prevented the first Congress
from enacting any postal legislation.

It merely, by a resolu

tion, made the legislation of the Continental Congress effective
A
until the second Congress should convene.
President Washington, in his third annual message, called the
attention of Congress to the need for postal legislation.
"The importance of the post-office and post-roads on a plan suffi
ciently liberal and comprehensive as they respect the expedition,
safety, and facility of communication, is increased by their in
strumentality in diffusing a knowledge of the laws and proceed
ings of the Government, which, while it contributes to the secur
ity of the people, serves also to guard them against the effects
of misrepresentation and misconception. The establishment of
additional cross posts, especially to some of the important points
in the western and northern parts of the union, cannot fail to be
of material utility."?
The second Congress, on February 20, 1782, passed an act to
establish the postoffice and post roads within the United States.®
The act was largely an elaboration of the acts of 1782 and 1784.
It established routes from Wisscassett, Maine, to Savannah,Georgia,
with forty-four cross routes, one extending as far west as
Danville, Kentucky.

The service could be performed on horseback

or by stages at the discretion of the Postmaster General.

The

routes were to be advertised for six months in one or more papers
in the state or states where the contract was to be performed,
and the contract was to be let to the lowest bidder for a term not
to exceed eight years.

Tie Postmaster General was empowered to

-
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extend any route, but the compensation for carrying the mail on
any extension was not to exceed the postage on the letters and
papers carried.

He was further empowered to contract for the

carrying of the mail on any new road on which a stage line was to
be established, but here also the compensation could not exceed
the postage on the mail to be carried, nor could a contract be
made which would result in a dimunition of postal revenue.

The

act further provided that all contracts were to be recorded with
in thirty days with the controller, who was to disburse the funds
of the department.
The postage rates prescribed by the act were high.

The charge

for each single letter (one page) was six cents for thirty miles,
eight cents for sixty miles, ten cents for one hundred miles, and
so on, with a maximum charge of twenty-five cents for any distance
greater than four hundred and fifty miles.

The rates were doubled

for a double letter, tripled for a triple letter, and any letter
more voluminous was to be charged at the rate of four single
letters per ounce.

Newspapers were charged one cent for any

distance up to one hundred miles, and one and one half cents for
any greater distance.

It also provided that exchange copies

could circulate free of charge.
Although the early postal policy was a liberal one, Congress
did not intend that public funds should be squandered on unpro
ductive routes.

In 1799 an act was passed requiring the Post

master General to report annually to Congress every post road
which, after the second year of its establishment, had failed to
produce one-third of the cost of carrying the mall on it.11

*5

In 1825 Congress authorized the Postmaster General to discontinue
the service on all routes which, after being established three
years, had failed to produce one-fourth of their cost.1®
Samuel Osgood of Massachusetts was appointed by President
Washington to be the first Postmaster General,

He was not a

member of the cabinet, and he submitted his annual report through
the Secretary of the Treasury.1*^ It was not until 1829, when
President Jackson appointed William T. Barry, that the Postmaster
General became a member of the cabinet.
Until 1838, with a few exceptions, the post office department
was self-supporting.

From 1838 to 1846, with one exception, an

annual deficit occurred.

There were several factors which

account for the deficit.

In the first place, railroad companies

and private expresses were doing a thriving business in carrying
the mail in spite of the fact that the act of 1792 made such an
offense a crime. 15

A second factor is found in the careless

manner in which the annual post route bill was compiled and passed
by Congress.

It had grown so bulky that It was no longer printed,

but it lay on the clerks desk for examination by every member nin
so far as his own district or state was concerned.” 16

Under such

a practice it would be surprising if extravagances did not occur.
This procedure was continued until after the establishment of the
United States Printing Office following the civil war.
In 1840 the British Parliament adopted penny postage.

That

reform created a demand for cheaper postage in this country, and
led to the enactment of a law in 1845 which reduced postage and
made several other reforms.17

Under this act, postage was reduced

-
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to five cents for each half ounce for any distance under three
hundred miles, and ten cents for any greater distance.

Weekly

newspapers were to circulate free of charge for a distance of not
greater than thirty miles from the place of publication.

For any

greater distance, or for daily or monthly publications, the rate
remained unchanged.

The act further stipulated that:

"It shall be the duty of the Postmaster General in all future
lettings of contracts for the transportation of the mail, to let
the same, in every case, to the lowest bidder tendering sufficient
guarantees for faithful performance, without other reference to
the mode of transportation than may be necessary to provide for
the due celerity, certainty, and security of such transportation.”18
Following the enactment of this law the service was classified
in the annual reports under the headings of railway, steamboat, and
”celerity, certainty, and security.”

The clerks in the department

used three astericks to denote the last phrase.

Thus it became

known as the star route service.
The Act of 1845 also increased the penalties for carrying the
mail in competition with the government postal service, and they
made all corporations liable within the meaning of the law.

It

was hoped that this, with the cheaper postage prescribed by the
bill, would put an end to competition, as it seemingly did.
The first year of operation under the reduced postage rates
left a deficit of $597,098, but each year following until 1851
produced a surplus which not only quieted the opposition to the
cheap postage, but created a demand for still lower rates which
culminated in the Act of 1851.19
The Act of 1851 established a postage of three cents for every
single letter going not over three thousand miles, with double
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that amount for any greater distance.
remained practically the same»2(3
established a new precedent.

The postage on newspapers

In one other respect the act

It provided that:

"No post office now in existence shall be discontinued, nor shall
the mail service on any mail route in any of the states or terri
tories be discontinued or diminished in any consequence of any
dimunltlon of the revenues that may result from this act; and it
shall be the duty of the Postmaster General to establish new post
offices, and place the mail service on any new mail routes
established, in the same manner as though this act had not been
passed."21
The year 1851 marked the end of a sound postal policy for some
years.

Annual deficits occurred in the succeeding years with

monotonous regularity passing the six million mark in 1860.

22

The great territorial expansion of the forties was in a large way
responsible for this.

Texas had been annexed, our claims to the

Oregon territory had been adjudicated, and California and the New
Mexican territories had been brought into the union as a result of
the Mexican war.

In addition to this the northwest territories

were filling up rapidly, and the Mormans had made their trek to
Utah.

All these territories required postal facilities, which,

on account of the vast areas of unsettled territory which any
postal route must traverse to reach them, cost far more than they
could produce.
It is not practicable to present a detailed account of the
expansion or the postal system which occurred in the years follow
ing 1851 in this paper, but the increase in the postal service to
California affords a striking example.

In 1847 Congress provided

for a monthly ocean service by way of Panama to San Fransico and
Astoria at a cost not to exceed $290,000 per annum.23

Three years

-
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later, in 1850, a monthly service from Independence, Missouri, to
Salt Lake City, Utah, was provided at a cost of $19,500.24

The

year following this route was extended to San Francisco, and
25
California was thus provided with an overland mail.
Another
route was established from Independence, Missouri, to Santa Fe,
PB
New Mexican Territory, in I860.
This line connected with
private expresses from California, so in reality it formed a third
route.

These routes must have been expedited and the service

increased, for in February 1857, according to testimony in the
United States Senate, the California mall was costing $1,300,000
annually.2^

Nevertheless, Congress in that year authorized a

new overland route by an amendment to the annual post office appro
priation bill.

It read:

"And be it further enacted, that the Postmaster -general be, and he
is hereby, authorized to contract for the conveyance of the entire
letter mail from such points on the Mississippi River as the con
tractors may select, to San Francisco, in the State of California,
for six years, at a cost not exceeding $300,000 per annum for
semi-monthly, $450,000 for weekly, or $600,000 for semi-weekly,
at the option of the Postmaster-general.28
While the law stated that the contractor shall select the
eastern terminus of the route, the power of the Postmaster General
to select the contractor virtually gave him that power.

Aaron V.

Brown, a native of Virginia and a resident of Tennessee, was Post
master General at that time, so the result was that a southern
route was selected which started at St. Louis and passed through
Little Rock, Arkansas, Preston, Texas, Fort Yuma, New Mexican
Territory, and thence to California.
protest from the north and west.

The action raised a storm of

One of the important questions

which had been before the preceding Congresses was the establish-

ment of a railroad to the Pacific.

No action had thus far been

taken because the north and south could not agree on Its location.
Thus the vociferous protest was not surprising since Postmaster
General Brown, in the annual report of that year, termed the route
"the pioneer route for the first great railway that may be con
structed to the Pacific."2®
The following years, 1858 to 1859, brought still more expansion
in the service to California.

The route by way of Salt Lake City

was provided with four horse stage service; a middle route from
Kansas City by way of Alberquerque to Stockton, California, was
established; and a southern route from New Orleans, by way of san
Antonio, to San Diego was provided.

Thus six mail routes to

California were provided. The annual report of 1859 shows that
*
the cost of the routes was $2,184,697, while they were producing
30
a revenue of only $339,749.
In 1860 there was a strong sentiment in Congress for postal
reform.

Postmaster General Hall, who succeeded Brown, suspended

service on a number of routes and curtailed it on others during
the recess of Congress in that year.

When Congress convened the

supporters of a generous postal policy attempted to nullify these
economies by a resolution which, if it had passed, would have
directed the Postmaster General to restore the service on all the
routes.

The resolution did pass the House but it was defeated in

the Senate so some retrenchment was accomplished.
The Civil War brought to an end the period of postal deficits
'
for a time. However, when the war ended Congress again gave some
attention to the establishment of rew routes, and deficits re-
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appe^red and grew.
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It was not until the disclosures of fraud were

made in the administration of star

nd steamboat routes that

economies were effected, and these economies were only temporary.
Frauds have played an important part in the evolution of the
United states postal laws.

rauds occurred nretty generally dur

ing prosperous periods when Congress was mo; t liberal in granting
postal appropriations.

The first of the ma,ior postal scsndlas had

its inception during the administration of vohn Quincy Adams, and
it extended into the early years of ^ackson's adminstratlon.

be

act which organized the United States postal system made no pro
vision for additional compensation for increased service beyond
the fact that it authorized the *ostmaoter Oeneral to extend routes
at his discretion, but it provided that the compensation for such
extensions should not exceed the revenue produced by the extension.
At times the lack of provision for increased service during the
oontraet term delayed needed postal expansion, so in 1825 Congress
72
authorized pro rata compensation for increased trips or mileage.
No provision was made, however, for expedited service.

ro meet

this deficiency the Postmaster General began the practice of
asking for optional bids on improved service at the regular let
tings,

'The low bid for the minimum service was the bid th^t was

accepted, but in the event that the improved

srviee became nec

essary, the bid on the improved service determined the compensation
the contractor would receive.

It was through this practice that

the first treat postal fraud originated.
‘ihe lotting of the contract for the Philadelphia-Pittsburg nail
is a good example of the way in which the frauds were accomplished.

The minimum epecifications called for a seventy-two hour week
day mail between the two cities.

The specifications for the im

proved service called for a letter mail on a sixty hour schedule
with a seventy-two hour mail for newspapers.

The low bid for the

minimum service was $7,000, and the bid that accompanied it for
the improved service was for 125,000.

The bid of :25,000 for the

improved service was not low, but in spite of that the low bid of
33
$7,000 was accepted, but the improved service was put on.
The
Senate Committee on Post Offices and .Post Roads, which conducted
an investigation of the department in 1835, estimated that the
United States was being defrauded of $157,000 annually through
this practice. S4

in order to correct this abuse a law was passed

in 1836 which provided for an increased compensation for expedi
tion in proportion to the increased expense incurred by the con
tractor.

The same act required the Postmaster General to accept

the lowest bid for the service to be put on.
Unfortunately the intent of Congress with respect to Increased
compensation for expedition was expressed in ambiguous terms, so
that this act, which was passed to correct abuses in the Post Office
Department, became the means which made the most nefarious of all
postal frauds possible.
In 1872 another postal scandal waft uncovered which led to more
legislation.

It was discovered that many contractors were using

straw bids as a means of securing lucrative contracts.

At that

time no bond was required to be filed with the bid, so anyone
could submit one.

As a result unscrupulous contractors would file

very low bids for their hostlers and drivers, and they would file

-
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a bid for themselves at an amount that would admit of considerable
profit.

When the bids were opened, the low bid would be tendered

the contract.

In the case of straw bids the contract would be

refused, and the Department would offer it to the next low bidder.
In the meantime this unscrupulous contractor would attempt to buyoff intermediate bids, with the result that eventually he might be
awarded the contract.

This practice resulted in the passage of

an act which required the filing of a bond with all bldB. 37

-
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Chapter II
THE ORIGIN OP THE STAR ROUTE FRAUDS.

It is important, in order to understand the star route frauds,
to have a knowledge of the organization of the Post Office Depart
ment as it was in 1879, and to be familiar with the laws which had
been established for its conduct.

The Act of 1792 had provided

for the Postmaster General and one assistant.
tants had been added in 1836.1

Two more assis

Very early in the history of the

department the Postmaster General had to entrust the details of
administration to his three subordinates because of the very large
amount of detail connected with the service, and because of the
inroads which political duties made upon his time.

The first

assistant postmaster general had in his charge the supervision of
post offices including such details as postmasters and their bonds,
money orders, and depredations against the mail.

The second

assistant was in charge of all the contracts for mail service.

It

was his duty to prepare advertisements of routes to be let, to
file the bids, and to make fines and deductions for failure, or
partial failure, to perform the service according to the condi
tions in the contract.

The third assistant had charge of the

revenue of the department, contracted for supplies, and was the
custodian of the dead letters.2
The sixth auditor, officially designated as the auditor for the
Post Office Department, was also an important postal official.
Originally his duties had belonged to the controller but the Act
of 1836 had transferred them.

The Post Office

Department was

-
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dlrected by law to record all contracts and to deposit all bonds
with the sixth auditor, who upon certification of service render
ed, would order the compensation paid.

In the event of failure

to fulfill a contract, the auditor was to direct the Attorney
General to bring suit on the bonds for any loss the government
Incurred through the failure.3

In addition, the sixth auditor

issued a quarterly statement of the financial condition of the
Post Office Department.
Contracts for carrying the mail on star routes were let for a
period of four years to the lowest bidder tendering a sufficient
guaranty of faithful performance.

Before a contract could be

awarded it must be advertised for six weeks in one or more papers
in the state or sta'tes where the service was to be performed.

The

advertisement contained a statement of the bond required, and a
description of the route, the length, the speed required, and the
frequency of the trips.

A certified check or draft equal to five

percent of the compensation at the last letting, or in the case of
new routes, five percent of the amount bid, was to be filed with
the bid.

After the contract was let a new bond was required, the

practice being to require a bond of ten dollars per mile.

If the

low bidder failed to provide an acceptable bond the Postmaster
General could enter into a contract with the next lowest bidder, or
if he deemed the other bids too high, he could re-advertise the
service.

The only persons ineligible by law in the awarding of

contracts were the employees of the department, or any person
known to be a member of any combination or ring formed for the
purpose of securing mail contracts.4

Star routes were usually

-
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advertised in the fall of the year, and the new contracts usually
went into effect at the beginning of the fiscal year.
The law permitted the employment of temporary service for a
period not exceeding twelve months without advertisement.

This

was the type of service usually employed on routes where the con
tractor had failed, and It was flequently employed upon new routes
pending, in either case, the outcome of the annual letting.
Temporary service was more expensive than ordinary service espec
ially on the longer routes, since no one could afford to stock a
route for a few months service except for a high return.
The Postmaster General was authorized by law "to provide for
carrying the mall on all post-roads established by law as often as
he, having due regard for the productiveness and other circum
stances, may think proper."6

in order that it would not be nec

essary to cancel the contracts for each alteration in the route
or schedule, the law provided that:
"Compensation for additional service in carrying the mall shall
not be in excess of the exact proportion which the original com
pensation bears to the original service; and when any additional
service is ordered, the sum to be allowed therefore shall be ex
pressed in the order... and no compensation shall be paid for any
additional service rendered before the issuing of such an order."'
"No extra allowance shall be made for any increase of expedition
in carrying the mail unless thereby the employment of additional
stock and carriers is made necessary, and in such case the addi
tional compensation shall bear no greater proportion to the addi
tional stock and carriers necessarily employed than the compen
sation in the original contract bears to the stock and carriers
necessarily employed in its execution." 8
The pro rata system of additional allowances was incorporated
into the postal laws by the acts of 1825 and 1836, respectively.
At that time it was understood in Congress that the increase in
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expense to the contractor would determine the sxtra allowance that
was to be made, not any mere ratio based upon the number of men
and horses employed.

it was expected that the same prudence and

common sense which men use in their own private enterprize would
be employed in public service.
Allowance for additional mileage was frequently made. Residents
living along a route have always been ready to petition for addi
tional trips on the mail route which serves them.

Senators and

Congressmen have always been easily persuaded that great public
good will result from increased mail service in their respective
districts; and the second assistant postmaster generals under
political pressure, usually granted the increases, sometimes upon
very slight pretext.

However, prior to 1876 the practice was

usually to give less than the pro rata allowance in computing the
additional compensation.10
Orders expediting a route were issued much less frequently than
those increasing the number of trips or mileage on a route.

Ths

first instance of the former may be found in Buchanan’s admini
stration when postal efficiency was at its lowest ebb.

In 1872

there were six cases of expedition, but the total allowance on
the six routes waB only $21,738.

Again during the years 1875 and

1876 there were seven cases with allowances totalling $60,976.60.11
In none of these instances,however, was the full pro rata compen
sation granted.
On July 23, 1876, Thomas J. Brady was sworn ir. as Second Assis
tant Post-master General, in charge of the transportation of mails.
With the induction of 3rady into office the golden era for the

-

contractors began.
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During the first year there were sixteen orders

Issued expediting the service on sixteen routes.

The original

contract price on these sixteen routes aggregated $184,544.84 per
annum.

The increased annual pay for expedited service totalled

$197,946.16 bringing the total annual cost of the routes to
$382,490.40.12
In addition to this, in the same year, additional trips were
ordered on a large number of routes, bringing the total number
of routes upon which extra allowances were made to two hundred
and fifty.
ment was
routes

wsb

The aggregate cost of the increased trips to the govern
604,336.09.

The original cost of the service on these

$1,090,620.92.

The additional number of trips re

quired averaged only 33 1/3 percent, while the additional cost
amounted to 58 1/6 percent.

Furthermore, although the law

specifically states that no compensation shall be paid for service
rendered before the issuing of an order, of the orders issued that
year by Brady granting increased allowances twenty-four were made
14
retroactive.
One of the first routes to be expedited by Brady was located
in Texas.

The contractor sent in a sworn statement of the addi

tional number of men and horses necessary to perform the expedited
service.

The statement was referred to the clerk in charge of the

Texas routes, who immediately noted its insufficiency.

He took

the statement to Brady and showed him that such a statement could
not serve as a reliable basis for computing the additional com
pensation.

He called Brady’s attention to the fact that the time

honored usuage of the department was to base the computation on a

-

18-

sworn statement of the increased cost to the contractor so that
the contractor’s profit would be no greater on the additional
service than it was on the original service.

Brady promised to

give the matter his consideration, and in a few days he issued
the ruling that the sworn statement of the contractor setting
forth the number of additional men and horses necessary to perform
any additional service would be the basis for computing additional
ic
compensation. °
The quadrennial letting of the star service in the states and
territories of Arkansas, California, Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana,
Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, Texas, Arizona, Dakota, Idaho, New
Mexico, Montana, Utah, Washington, Wyoming and the Indian Terri
tory occurred under the advertisement of November 1, 1877, with
the service on the contracts thus awarded beginning July 1, 1878.
Probably because of this there were fewer orders authorizing addi
tional service during that year.

However there were sixty-three

orders Issued authorizing additional trips, fifty-one of which
applied to routes in the Pacific section.

The increased allow

ances on these routes aggregated $119,929.39.

As the original

aggregate contract price on these routes was |188,745.80, the cost
of operating them was Increased sixty-four per ceht.^6
The star routes upon which bids were asked in the advertisement
of November 1, 1877 comprised about sixty per cent of the entire
star service.

In view of Brady’s record during the first year and

a half of his incumbency, one would expect to find the specifica
tions of the routes advertised providing for a more generous ser
vice than that provided under the previous contracts.

Brady had

-

19-

proved himself to be very liberal in providing postal service in
the west.

The whole region west of the Mississippi was exper

iencing a wonderful expansion.

There had been a great migration

to the west following the Civil War which had not yet ceased.
Much of the great plains region had already been homesteaded.
Herds of cattle already dotted the range land so recently vacated
by the buffalo.

Such mining camps as Leadville, Deadwood, and

Central City were already booming.

The events of the paBt cer

tainly indicated an active four years in the west.
expected an expansion.

Brady himself

In his annual report under the date of

November 1, the same day that the advertising of routes was begun,
he said:
"The demand for increased mail facilities is probably greater at
this time than ever before in the history of the department, and
particularly is this true of service other than railway. It has,
therefore, been deemed best to make a liberal estimate for this
branch of the service, and the sum of $7,090,673 is asked for,"17
The estimate provided for an increase of $523,247 for star
route service.
Furthermore, Brady was charged by the law "to form the best
Judgement practicable as to the mode, time and frequency of trans
porting the mail" and to advertise accordingly.

Had this been

done millions of dollars would have been saved.

However, the new

specifications provided for very little improved service, and the
improved service was offset by diminished sorvlco on other routes.
The great mass of the routes remained unchanged.

From a financial

standpoint the letting appeared to be a great success.

The star

route service in all the territory west of the Mississippi had
cost $3,124,137 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1878.

The

service under the new contracts was begun July 1,1878 for the sum
of §2,009,280.

The saving, however, was very temporary for at

the end of the fiscal year the cost had been §3,706,977.
The increased cost during the year 1878-1879 was due largely to
extra allowances for expedited and increased service on the routes
controlled by thirteen men.
#1,399,876.93.

These allowances amounted to

In addition to this, temporary contracts were

awarded to these same thirteen men totalling #168,395.68.

On May

10, bids were asked on new service to begin October 1, in this
same territory.

The contracts thus let totalled #47,248.59 which

is chargeable to the increase.

The balance of the increase,

#80,468.41, represents the extra allowances and the temporary con1Q
tracts awarded to other parties than the favored few.
The cost
of the entire star route service for the year ending June 30, 1878
was #5,714,943 as compared with #5,663,970 the previous year. Such
service in the sections east of the Mississippi was decreasing each
year due to the rapid expansion of railroads in that section, and
it was this fact that served to shield the department.20
A comparison of the old and new contract provisions for some of
the routes studied in the light of the subsequent history of these
routes produces some interesting facts.

A route from Fort Worth,

Texas, to Yuma, Arizona, which formerly comprised three routes, was
let at a specified distance of 1,560 miles while the distance given
for the route in the register for 1874-1878 was 1,467 miles.

Under

the old contract the mail was carried from Fort Worth to Yuma in
433.40 hours, but the routes had been expedited by Brady, so that
in 1877 the time required was 358.90 hours.

By the new contract a
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schedule of 408 hours was provided, and the speed was specified at
S~20?

P©r hour.

The specified rate of speed was higher

than necessary, since the fictious distance would give the con
tractor 24.35 hours more time to cover the route.

The contract

was awarded to John T. Chidester for the sum of $134,000 per
annum.

The average bid was $225,000, and two of the ten bids sub

mitted were in excess of $300,000.
On August 15, 1878, six weeks after the new contract went into
force, Brady issued an order reducing the running time to 312
hours, and granting an additional compensation of $165,000 per
annum.

The expedited schedule, according to the sworn statement

of Chidester, would require the services of 180 carries and 986
horses, whereby the original schedule had required only 92
carriers and 378 horses.

Two days after filing this affidavit

Chidester wrote the department offering to carry the mail on the
expedited schedule for $165,000, that being much less than pro
rata.
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For approximately a twenty-five per cent increase in

speed on this route, the compensation was raised 123 per cent.
The route from Fargo to Pembina, in the Dakota Territory, had
been let first in 1874 on the running time of 36 hours for the
156 miles.

The speed specified was 4.27 miles per hour, and three

trips a week were to be made.
to six trips a week.

In 1875 the service was increased

The new contract put the route on a slower

schedule, 79 hours being specified.
less than two miles per hour.

This required a speed of

The contract was awarded to Luke

Voorhees for the sum of $17,000 per annum, a saving over the pre
vious contract of $806.60 a year.

On July 30, 1878 an order was
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issued reducing the running time to 46| hours with seven mails a
week.

For this increase in service the contractor was paid

lil3,000 per annum.
The route from Prescott, Arizona Territory, to Santa Fe, New
Mexican Territory, was, according to the specifications of 1674,
485 miles long.

The time allowed in that year was 168 hours, at

a specified rate of speed of 2.89 miles per hour.

The service

originally provided for but one mall a week, but a second mail had
been added in 1875.
service.

The new contracts provided for a more liberal

The running time was reduced to 150 hours and three trips

a week were provided for, but the distance was specified to be
529| miles.

The contract was awarded to George L. McDonough for

the sum of $13,313.

The old contract price on the basis of two

trips a week was $42,033 so a considerable saving was seemingly
effected.
The old contract on this route was allowed to run on till
September 30.

During October the running time was reduced to 90

hours and four trips a week were added.
compensation of $73,000 was allowed.

For this an additional
About the first of August

John A. Walsh was given a subcontract which was filed with the
department according to custom, so it was he who performed the
service and received the compensation from that time on.

On March

11, 1879, by reason of complaints about the service, so it was
alleged, George McDonough was declared to be a falling contractor,
and on that same day the service was reduced to its original status^
l.e., three trips a week with a running time of 150 hours.

The

men who had signed McDonough*s bond* Gleason and Kirk by name, were

-

off ered the contract.
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This was the usual procedure of the depart

ment in order that the bondsmen might protect themselves against
the loss which they would be liable for if the contract was re-let
for a higher figure.

In this case the bondsmen refused to assume

the contract unless they were assured that the service would be
restored, and the former compensation of „73,000 per annum granted.
Walsh then offered to perform the service for $18,500, and since
that offer was $500 less than the second lowest bid, it was
accepted.

On July 10 Brady issued an order restoring a daily ser

vice on a 96 hour schedule, and granting an additional allowance
of ^117,475.“

so Walsh, who in reality was the man who had

failed to perform a satisfactory service under the old contract,
became the contractor on a schedule which was six hours slower,
but with the compensation increased $62,975 over the sum allowed
him on the original contract.
The route from Red River Landing to Shreveport, in Louisiana,
was let in 1874 at a distance of 278| miles on a 56 hour schedule
six days a week.

In 1878 the route was listed as being 261 miles

long, but it was reduced to a 60 hour schedule three times a week.
Thus a much poorer service was provided.

The contract was let to

B. H. Peterson for the sum of $11,700 per annum,

Peterson had also

been the contractor for the term 1874-1878 at the rate of $15,000
per annum, so according to his bids he valued the difference of
three trips at $3,300 per year.

Yet in July 1879 Brady expedited

the route to a 48 hour schedule six times a week, and granted an
additional compensation of $40,261 per annum.25
The route from Vlnita, Indian Territory, to Las Vegas, New

-

Mexico, was a new one.
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It was first advertised May 10, 1878 as

being 725 miles in length, and bids were asked on a service once
a week on a schedule of 240 hours.
Parket for $6,330 per annum.
J. W. Parker.

The contract was let to V. W.

He in turn sublet to his brother

After the contract was let it was discovered that

the true length of the route was 638 miles, and the distance was
changed.

Three days before the commencement of the service, on

October 1, 1878, 85 miles were added to the route and an addition
al compensation of ,843.34 was added to the compensation.

On

October 8, 69 miles more were added and the compensation was in
creased $684.59.

On November 9, the service was ordered Increased

to three trips a week and an additional compensation of
was granted.

15,716.86

This brought the annual compensation to :23,573.79.

On March 19, a retractive order was issued granting compensation
for eighteen additional miles at
effective January 1st.

535.77, the order being made

On December 23, an order was Issued re

ducing the running time to 168 hours and granting an additional
compensation of $31,846.59, effective January 1st.

Finally, with

the beginning of the next fiscal year, the service was made a
daily one with an additional compensation of $86,052.59.

Thus

the total compensation in one year was raised from $6,330 to
$150,592.02.

Pfi

These cases are related as typical of over four hundred other
cases.

The information regarding them was published annually in

the Postmaster General’s Report, and also in the Annual Register
which was published by the Department of Interior.

The records

clearly showed that the routes on which the big increases had
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occurred were generally let for a ridiculously low figure - a price which in many instances would be ruinous to a contractor
if he were forced to carry it out.

The names of certain men

appeared as contractors very frequently on routes where large
increases had been given.

Several of these routes on which large

increases were given after July 1, 1878 had had the service re
duced by the contracts which went into effect on that date.

The

distances of the routes were manipulated to the advantage of the
contractor.

In some Instances exaggerated distances were cut

down after the award had been made, when the true distance would
work to the advantage of the contractor in the determination of
the compensation for additional mileage.

In other Instances the

routes were advertised at less than their true distance, and after
the award had been made a claim would be filed for a pro rata
adjustment in compensation based upon the true mileage.2^

Expe

dition was granted on the sworn statements of the contractors
without any effort being made to determine the truth of the state
ments.

Finally, forty-eight of the orders for additional compen

sation, which were issued were between July 1, 1878 and December
31, 1879, were made retroactive.

PR

During the first half of the fiscal year 1879-1880 the same
reckless spending continued.
$5,900,000.

The appropriation for that year was

The commitments of the department for star service on

July 1, equalled the appropriation.

The contracts

awarded in the

spring of 1879 for new service on 1,300 of the 2,000 new routes
established by the preceding Congress, service on which was to
begin on October 1, totalled $434,000.

Thus the appropriation
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was more than consumed, but in spite of that other commitments were
made.

Orders further expediting the service were Issued totalling

$362,205, and the service was Increased to such an extent that the
department was committed for $897,110 more.

This in addition to

commitments for temporary service created a deficit of .1,694,096.
The cost of the service throughout the eighteen western states,
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which eighteen months earlier had been $2,009,280, had now swollen
to $4,468,532.30.30
The forty-sixth Congress was called into extra session in March
1879 and they did not adjourn until July 1, yet no message concerning a deficit was sent to it by Postmaster General Brady.

In

October the annual report was prepared but no mention was made in
the report of a deficit by either the Postmaster General or the
Second Assistant although this had been done in the past.

Further

more, the law directed that a report should be made to each
Congress of all allowances made to contractors over and above the
.

sums originally stipulated in the contracts.

But the United States

Register, in which this report was supposed to be published was
published in November with the following note:
"It has been found impossible on the part of those having the
matter in charge to supply the statistics relating to the postal
service of the United States in time to admit of the publication
of the Official Register in its usual form earlier than March or
April 1880. It is therefore deemed expedient to issue the work
in two volumes, in order that such portion of it as could be pre
pared might be^avallable for the use of Congress at its convening
in December." 3^
On December 10 Congress was notified of a probable deficiency
in the appropriation for the star route service in a letter from
the Postmaster General.

In it he asked that $2,000,000 be appro

priated from the unexpended balances of former years.

This
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communication was referred to the Committee on Appropriations.32
On January 8 the Committee reported a resolution authorizing an
investigation by a subcommittee of the Committee of Appropriations
into the causes of the deficiency.

The subcommittee was to have

power to subpoena persons and records and to administer oaths.33
It is doubtful if any investigation would have been undertaken by
the House had it not been that the press of the nation, following
the lead of A.M. Gibson in the New York Sun, demanded an investi
gation.34
Brady was the first witness to be summoned before the committee.
His testimony brought out the fact that there had been a surplus of
appropriated funds turned back to the treasury since he took office
totalling $3,965,468.27.

That of the $5,900,00 appropriated for

the current year, $5,800,000had been expended during the first
half of the year.

He always believed, he said, in a generous

postal policy "which will give a maximum of service under liberal
appropriations," and he believed that that was the policy which
Congress wanted him to follow.35

That was the reason why, on the

receipt of petitions or at the request of a member of Congress,
such large increases had been mad?;.

He stated further that there

was no deficiency, and that none would be created.

If a deficiency

appropriation was not forthcoming service would be reduced so that
the expenditure would come within the appropriation.35
His testimony, or the questions of his inquisitors, failed to
reveal the fact that a deficiency had occurred for the inland
transportation of mails other than railway appropriations for the
years 1877 and 1879, or that much of the $3,965,468 surplus, which
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Brady took such pride in, was lergely the unexpended surplus of
deficiency appropriations of other years.3^

They did establish

the fact, however, that in order to bring the expenditures with
in the appropriation, star route service would have to be curtailed
to such an extent that weekly service would likely be the result.
The department in order to curtail service had to pay the contrac
tor a month’s allowance.

Since the funds would be all expended

on April 10, it would be necessary to stop all the service on
March 10, in order to pay the allowances.

That meant that there

was an appropriation enough to provide for the star route service
on its present basis for just two months and ten days.

Half the

month of January had elapsed before the hearing had begun, and
there would be no hope of action before February.

By that time

there would be just one month’s appropriation to be spread over
five months.38
The committee undertook a study of the data relating to the
routes on which the largest allowances had been made.

They

examined several contractors in an effort to determine whether or
not there had been any collusion in the bidding or whether any
assurance had been given that extra allowance would be made, but
they failed to discover any direct evidence.

Some of the contrac

tors admitted that their bids were below cost, but they stated
that the rapid development of the country, they felt sure, would
make an increase in service necessary.

Others explained that

they carried the mail as a sideline to a profitable passenger and
express business. 39

The books of none of the contractors were

examined to verify their statements.
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Only one large contractor, Monroe Salisbury, was summoned.

He

testified that he had an interest in about seventy-five mail routes.
On seventeen of these mail routes he had been granted increased
allowances in excess of „5,000.

The aggregate compensation of

these contracts, according to their original terms, was $147,700.
The increased compensation for additional trips aggregated
$189,278.20, and for expedition $217,005.24.*0

Salisbury was

summoned by the committee because he had asserted that the inves
tigation was being undertaken because of the charges in the press
made by certain newspaper men who had failed in an attempt to
blackmail him.

The committee failed to discover any evidence

that Gibson had attempted to blackmail any of the contractors,
but his subsequent conduct Indicates that Salisbury's charges
were probably true.4-*Evidence of certain irregularities were, however, discovered.
John A. Walsh was indebted to the government for failure on
several routes, but no attempt was being made to collect the in
debtedness, and the Sixth Auditor continued to pay him all that
was due on his other contracts.42

It was discovered that on the

Vinita-Las Vegas route, of which Parker was the contractor,
charges had been made by the Postmaster at Red River Springs that
mail deliveries were made no further east than that point,

He

charged that the mailman would ride a few miles past that point
only to return the next day with the same mail pouch, although
five hundred miles of the route lay to the east.

Special Agent

Charles Adams was ordered to investigate the route, but his duties
were so heavy at that time that the case was withdrawn from him
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and assigned to another agent.

However, the complaint by the

Postmaster waB filed in the fall of 1873, and Adams waB not
assigned the case until July 1789, and it was not until September
of that year that the case was investigated.

Throughout the

months when those charges were lying on Brady's desk the compen43
sation on that route had been increased from $6,330 to 3160,592 JOB
Adams, in giving this testimony, also stated that on the portion
of the route from Vinita to Red River Springs there was no need
for any mail service since there were only two posts along that
intervening five hundred odd miles, and these post were supplied
from the Santa Fe line in Kansas. 4
The committee attempted to determine the reason for the failure
to make a complete report, but they could get no satisfactory
answer.

Brady attempted to shift the responsibility to the Sixth

Auditor, but he was forced to admit that the Sixth Auditor would
merely be reporting back figures which Brady had originally sub
mitted to him.

Laurie, the department statistician, testified

that the reports of extra allowances were made out weekly, so
that all that was required was a tabulation of the weekly re orts.
Laurie, however, substantiated Brady's assertion that it was the
Sixth Auditor's duty to make out that report.4^
The investigation by the sub-committee of the Committee of
Appropriations was not a success, possibly because there was no
real sentiment in the house for postal reform.

Early in February

before the Investigation was completed the committee reported a
deficiency appropriation bill providing funds to meet the defic
iency after all increases in excess of $5,000 had been stricken
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off, and the one hundred and seven routes on which those Increases
46
had been made were reduced to the terms of the original contract.
This measure raised such a storm of protest in the House that the
next day the Committee reported a substitute bill providing for
the appropriation of $970,000 or as much as msy be needed to meet
the deficiency after all expedited service which cost over $2,500
had been cut off.

The bill also provided $100,000 for new service.

This bill was adopted by the house without a division.4^
Senate the friends of the contractors were even stronger.

in the
The

text of the senate bill follows:
"That the sum of eleven hundred thousand dollars, or as much there
of as may be necessary, be, and the same is hereby appropriated out
of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated to meet the
expenses of Inland mail transportation on star routes for the re
mainder of the current fiscal year. During the remainder of the
year no further expediting of service on any postal star route
shall be made."
See. 2. That the sum of one hundred thousand dollars be, and the
same is hereby appropriated as aforesaid, to enable the Postmaster
General to place new service as authorized by law; Provided, that
the Postmaster General shall not hereafter have the power to ex
pedite the service under any contract either now or hereafter
given to a rate of pay exceeding fifty per cent upon the contract
as originally let.
Sec. 4. Nothing in this act contained shall be deemed or construed
to affect the validity or legality of the acts or omissions of any.Q
officer of the United States or to affect any proceedings thereof?48
The act was passed by the Senate without a division.

The con

ference committee remained deadlocked for about three weeks before
49
the House yielded to the Senate.
After the passage of this act
the House only summoned one more witness, and with that they seemed
to think their work was done.

The only other reference to the

Investigation to be found was in the annual report of the Committee
on Appropriations for the Post Office Department. There they re-
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ferred to the remedial legislation which was adopted; i.e. the
provision prohibiting additional allowances

beyond fifty per

cent, as being a.sufficient safeguard against the abuses which
had existed.50
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Chapter III
THE STAR ROUTE INVESTIGATION.

Following the close of the hearings conducted by the Appropria
tions Committee of the House there was no serious attempt on the
part of any government official to discover any fraud in connection
with the star route service before the inauguration of Garfield.
Corkhlll, the United States District Attorney for the district,
seems to have conducted a grand Jury investigation, but he was so
friendly with the leading mail contractors that any investigation
which he would direct would be no more than a pretension.^

The

party platforms of 1880 all remained silent on the question.
Nevertheless, a section of the press kept the question constantly
before the public, and, although the mall contractors were ably
supported by a strong press, it became almost mandatory upon the
incoming president to conduct a thorough investigation.
Garfield was inaugurated on March 4, 1881.
plurality of less than ten thousand votes.

He was elected by a

The narrow margin of

victory would no doubt impress upon Garfield the need for a change
in policy on the part of the Republican party if they were to con
tinue in control of the government.

On March 3, Garfield invited

Thomas L. James to come into the cabinet as Postmaster General, and
at that time he expressed himself as having grave suspicions con
cerning the conduct of affairs in the Post Office Department.

He

said to James that if he accepted the office he would be expected
P
to conduct a thorough investigation.
The choice of a Postmaster
General was a happy one, for James had, during his tenure as post
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master, purged the postoffice of New York City of the spoils
system.

This work had been accomplished In the face of the bitter

opposition of the machine politicians so it had won James a nat
ional reputation as a fearless and incorruptible man.

While James

was supposed to be a Conkling man the political ties which bound
him to the Stalwart group were not very strong.

This is indicated

by the fact that Conkling was indifferent as to his appointment.3
James,soon after he took office, had a second conference with
Garfield relative to the star routes.

At this time the president

expressed himself to James as being satisfied that there had been
willful waste and gross corruption in the department.

He ordered

an investigation in order that all extravagant and unnecessary
mail service might be cut off, and that any person who was found
guilty of fraud should be turned over to the Department of Justice
for prosecution,4

James then recommended the re-appointment of

P. H. Woodward who had been the chief special agent of the Post
Office Department, but who had recently retired.

Gari. laid con

curred in this recommendation, and Woodward was summoned and sworn
in.

A day or so later Garfield requested that Woodward, in view

of his years of experience and because of his trustworthiness, be
detailed to investigate the applicants for postmasters in certain
southern cities before Undertaking the star route investigation.
The investigation was therefore postponed until early in April.5
On his return from the south Woodward began a survey of the
papers in connection with soma of the routes on which large in
creases had been granted.

In .this preliminary work he was assisted

by A. M. Gibson of the New York Sun who had been active in exposing
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star route conditions in the press.

Gibson had drawn up a table

of ninety-three routes which had been conspicuously increased.
This table gave the provisions of the contract for term 1874-78
together with the terms of the contract which became effective
in 1878 and the orders increasing the service or expedition.6 This
table, and Gibson’s knowledge of the contractors and their methods,
was of great help to Woodward.

In a few days time he was able to

collect enough data from the files, which, while it was not conclu
sive evidence, was certainly indicative of fraud.

James, accom

panied by Woodward, took this material to Garfield, who expressed
his amazement at the disclosures.

He requested that the findings

of this preliminary survey should be laid before Attorney General
MacVeagh, and that the three of them should return at an early
date and consult with him.

7

On the following afternoon a lengthy consultation was held in
Garfield’s study.
present.

Garfield, James, MacVeagh, and Woodward were

On this occasion, in connection with the policy that the

government should pursue, James suggested that it might be wise to
resort to civil suits for the recovery of money obtained through
fraud rather than to bring criminal actions.
dent replied at once, "No".

To this the Presi

"One moment, Mr. President," said

the Attorney General, "consider whether or not the Postmaster
General is not right.

Before a final decision remember that these

precedings may strike men in high places; that they may result in
changing a Republican majority (of one) in the United States Senate
into a Democratic majority; that it may effect persons who claim
that you are under personal obligations to them for services
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rendered during the last campaign - - and one person in particular
who asserts that without his management you could never have been
elected.

Look these facts squarely in the face before taking a

final stand, for neither the Postmaster General nor myself will
know friend or foe in this matter."

The President paced the floor

for a moment and then replied, "No; I have sworn,to execute the
laws.

Go ahead regardless of where or whom you hit.

I direct you

both not only to probe the ulcer to the bottom, but to cut it outff®
At that time it was definitely known that the investigation
would involve S.W. Dorsey, who was an ex-Senator and secretary of
the National Republican Committee, and who had been one of Garfieldfe
closest political advisors during the recent campaign.

It was

also suspected that it might involve William Pitt Kellogg, a
Republican of considerable power in Louisiana who at that time was
United States Senator from that state.

In retaliation Kellogg

could reveal the facts about the disputed election of 1876.
was a third party leader who was involved.

Brady

He had collected money

from the employees and officials in the Post Office Department,and
had thus materially aided in financing the recent campaign.

This

fact, if it was known, would be sure to hurt Garfield since it was
contrary to the spirit of the platform upon which he ran.

Garfield

was well aware that the situation was ladened with political dan
gers and his decision was a thoroughly creditable one for him as
leader of his party.
Following the conference with Garfield the investigation got
underway in earnest.

Woodward requested that Gibson be appointed

to aid him, which was done with Garfield's consent.

Reliable
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postal inspectors were called in to receive special instructions
before beginning a survey of all doubtful routes.

Special instruc

tions were prepared for each agent outlining the information that
was desired on each route.

In cases where fraud appeared likely

the agents were to collect what evidence they could in the form of
depositions, letters, and telegrams.

In all cases they were asked

to make recommendations concerning the continuance of the service.
MacVeagh attended the conference and cautioned the agents against
prejudgement.

He told them that the government would rather find

that the service was necessary and not corrupt, but that they
wanted the facts.9
During the spring, as disclosures warranted, the precaution was
taken to remove all men from the department who might be involved,
or whose sympathies were with the contractors under suspicion.
ThuB the resignations of Brady, and of Eaton, the Superintendent of
of the Railway Mail service with whom all complaints concerning the
transportation of mail were filed, were secured,and several of the
clerks in the department were removed.

The President also directed

the Secretary of the Treasury to remove J. M. McGraw, the Sixth
Auditor, and Fred B. Lllley, his deputy.10
Early in May, when the scope of the investigation began to
widen it was thought necessary to employ another counsel. Gibson
/
recommended that William A. Cook be retained, and he prevailed
upon James and Woodward to recommend him to MacVeagh.

MacVeagh

summoned Cook to a conference on May 10, and on June 1 he publicly
announced the addition of Cook to the staff.11

Cook was a criminal

lawyer of dubious character but considerable ability.

The Evening
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Star, remarking about his appointment editorially, said:
"The selection of William A. Cook,
criminal bar of the District, as a
general to take charge of the star
that the government means business
cases.

concededly at the head of the
special assistant attorneyroute Investigation, shows
in the prosecution of theBe

Garfield was not so sure of the wisdom of this appointment.

On

June 1 he wrote in his Journal, "I learned some things about the
employment of Gibson and Cook by the Attorney General, in connec
tion with the Post Office Investigation which trouble me.

The

latter has long been my defamer, the former has an unsavory reputa
tion. "I*3
these men.

Garfield must have been confused as to the identity of
Gibson was a Democratic newspaper man, and it is very

probable that he had written some bitter attacks on Garfield.
When Woodward expressed a desire to have Gibson associated with him
in the investigation, Gibson stipulated that it must be with the
consent of Garfield, and MacVeagh testified that Garfield's consent
was obtained.

It was likely that when Garfield gave his consent he

was not familiar with the fact that Gibson had undertaken the
study of the star route administration on behalf of Tllden, who
helped to finance the expense in the expectation of using the find
ings in the campaign of 1880.

While he might not object to the

appointment of a newspaperman who had opposed him in 1880, he cer
tainly would not wish to employ one of Tilden's confidaAtl*
There is no evidence to show that Gibson had an unsavory repu
tation at that time.

He was the Washington correspondent of one

of the leading New York papers and he possessed the confidence of
many prominent men in Washington, both Republicans and Democrats.
There is no evidence to show that he was consulted about Cook,
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end it is probably the reputation of that man that concerned him
him most.

On June 6 the following entry appeared in his journal:

"I sent for Mr. Woodward, Post Office inspector, to find what was
being done in the star route investigation, and to know why Gibson
and Cook had been employed....

I find there is much feeling among

my friends that such men should have been employed without first
consulting me.” 15
Woodward testified, three years later that he found Garfield
greatly perturbed particularly about the appointment of Cook.

The

day before a Judge of the Supreme Court had told the President that
Cook was one of the most disreputable members of the Washington bar,
and that the selection was a disgrace to the administration.
Woodward Justified the appointment on the grounds that it was adrantageous to have some one connected with the investigation who
was familiar with the darker elements in the life of the district,
and he believed that he successfully allayed Garfield’s apprehensions.

1A

At any rate Garfield subsequently held a conference with
17
Cook relative to the investigation.
The reportE of the postal inspectors which were made during the
summer and fall of 1881 disclosed conditions to be even worse than
was supposed.

They verified the extravagance of the increased and

expedited service, but they also disclosed the fact, supported by
depositions from drivers and postmaster along the various routes,
that much of the service which was being paid for at extravagant
prices was not being performed.

18

jn some instances where in

creased service was Justified it had not been granted until the
contract had been assumed by a contractor connected with one of the

-

'’rings."
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Frequently the new and increased service granted by the

department was more generous than the petitions coming from the
route had requested.

In other instances expedited service was

shown to have been granted by Brady over the remonstrances of the
postmasters and subcontractors along the r o u t e s . i n another
Instance the postmaster confessed that she had recommended the ex
pedited service against her better Judgement after being threatened
with losing her position.

In other instances the postmasters

were shown to have been influenced or bribed by the contractors so
that the truth about the service on the routes would not be report
ed, and no fines or deductions could then be made."1
of justifiable expedition were rare.

Instances

In most instances the expe

dited schedule did not provide any better connections with railway
terminals than were had under the old schedules.22
It was further established from the reports of the inspectors,
that the affidavits upon which the increased compensation was
granted were, without exception, false.

Generally the number of

men and horses necessary to perform the original contract was
stated to be less than the number actually used, while the number
given as necessary to perform the increased or expedited service
was always more than the number actually employed.

Thus the pro

rata Increases granted were absurd, even when figured according to
Brady’s interpretation of the law.
As the reports from the Inspectors came in, service on each
route was curtailed to meet the recommendations of the Inspectors
who had gone over it.

Thus in the period from March 4, 1861 to

December 31, 1881, $1,713,541 of star route service was cut off.

22
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Further reductions were made in 1882, the total saving to the de
partment being estimated at $2,172,132 per annum by the committee
of the House which conducted the hearings in 1884. 2 4
On the basis of the inspectors* reports, Gibson compiled a table
25
of 419 routes which bore evidence of fraud.
This table was in
tended to serve as a part of the preliminary report on the investi
gation, but it contains most of the routes which were bad.

The

contracts on these routes were held by a am&ll group of men.

This

group however, was organized into rings or combinations, so that
the actual control rested with some dozen men.

The Salisbury

combination held the largest interest, controlling about thirtyfive per cent of the routes.

The Parker combination was next

controlling about thirty per cent.

The Dorsey combination was

third controlling about twelve per cent.

However, the Dorsey

routes were longer so they received about twenty per cent of the
amounts paid by the government on the routes listed in the table.
Barlow and Sanderson, Hearns and Roots, J.D. Colegrove, and

J. B.

Price also controlled routes which were immensely profitable since
their profits did not have to be divided among so many.
The problem of bringing these men to Justice was a difficult one.
It was early discovered that an action charging perjury would pro
bably not be sustained since the postal laws failed to prescribe a
penalty for making a false affidavit.

It was also ascertained

that Individuals could not be prosecuted for fraud against the
United States unless the fraud was committed against the revenue
department.

There remained no alternative, except in a few cases

where evidence of bribery could be obtained, or in instances where
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false bonds had been sworn to, but to bring charges against the concontractors and government officials for conspriacy to defraud. The
law was explicit in regard to that charge.

Section 5440 of the

Revised Statutes provided that:
”...If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States in any
manner or for any purpose, and one or more persons do any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, all parties to such a con
spiracy shall be liable to a penalty of npt less than $1,000 nor
more than 10,000, and imprisonment.....”^5
It was thus not only necessary to prove fraud, but it was nec
essary to prove a conscious and willful effort on the part of each
individual cited in the indictment to commit the fraud.

For an

action of this kind there was little direct evidence available.
The fact that the United States was paying enormous sums for insig
nificant service, or for service that was not being performed, was
conclusive evidence

of fraud, but it was not evidence of conspiracy.

In order to secure evid nee of that it was necessary to offer
immunity to some of the lesser violators in return for their testi
mony.
The first important confession was received from Mont ford C.
Rerdell.

He had acted as secretary and bookkeeper for Dorsey, and

he was interested personally in several of the routes, so that he
was thoroughly familiar with the conduct of the Dorsey business.
Early in June ex-Senator Clayton of Arkansas brought word to James
that Rerdell was willing to testify, so an appointment was made
with MacVeagh and a sworn statement was t a k e n . T h e statement
revealed in detail all the practices of the corrupt contractors,
and it constituted direct evid nee against ex-Senator S. W. Dorsey,
J. W. Dorsey, Miner, Peck, and Vaile of the Dorsey ring, and Brady
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and Turner of the Post Office Department.

It described how the

bids were sworn to In blank before a notary, and how the amounts
were later filled In with figures supplied by Dorsey or Miner
shortly before the bids became due, and presumably after the In
formation had been received from someone in the department concern
ing the amounts of the bids already filed.

After a contract was

secured petitions for the Increase or expedition of the service,
or for the establishment of new postoffices which would result in
additional mileage, were drawn up in Washington and forwarded to
some agent along the route for circulation.

Occasionally these

petitions were altered after they had been circulated.

He cited,

as an example, a petition for increased service on route number
40104 in which the words "on a schedule of 60 hours instead of
84 hours" were interpolated after the petition had been returned
to Washington.

Many of the affidavits rpon which increased com

pensation was granted were signed by the subcontractor or foremen
in blank, and the figures were filled in after they had been for
warded to Washington.

The statement cited a number of instances

in which Dorsey had filled in the numbers in his own hand.

Brady,

represented on the Dorsey books as William Smith, was paid thirtythree and one third per cent of all allowances for increased serv
ice,and fifty per cent of all deductions and fines which were re
mitted.

William H. Turner, a clerk in the contract office, was

also paid lesser amounts under the name of Samuel Jones.
When Dorsey heard about his betrayal by Rerdell he was consider
ably shaken.

Ex-Senator Spencer testified to James that Dorsey

came into his room in the Everett Hotel in New York City on the

night of June 12 In a highly demoralized state.

He told Spencer

that Rerdell had betrayed him, and he begged Spencer and the Hon.
S. B. Elkins, who was also present, to help him.28

Following that

interview Dorsey made a hurried trip to Washington, and, in
company with a senator whose name has been deleted from the report,
OQ
saw Rerdell and induced him to repudiate his confession#
Although the confession, after its repudiation, was of doubtful
value in the actual prosecution of the case, it was nevertheless
a valuable acquisition in that it served as a guid
able spots In the Dorsey system.

to the vulner

Rerdell had called the attention

of the officers to the hand writing on the petitions and affadivits.
Without the confession they still had a strong case against the
Dorsey ring.
Nineteen routes were selected on which to base the indictment
of the Dorsey group.

It is doubtful if any of the Dorsey routes

were exempt from fraud, but the nineteen selected to be presented
to the grand Jury were so well evidenced that there should have
been no doubt in the mind of any reasonable man concerning the
guilt of Dorsey and his associates.

The fraudulent practices on

the routes did not vary a great deal, so two routes will be cited
here to illustrate them.
The route from Canyon City to Camp MacDermitt, in Oregon, had
been let to Peck in 1878 for

.5 2, 888.30

One trip a week was to have

been performed on a schedule of 130 hours.

The contract was to

become effective July 1 of that year but Indian troubles along the
line prevented the service from being performed on the Canyon City
end before November, and on the other end before December.

How
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ever, Indian'troubles did not delay the efforts of the contractor
to have the service increased,for on September 18, 1878, Peck
filed an affidavit setting forth the number of men and horses then
performing the service together with the number that would be nec
essary to perform the service three times a week on a ninety-six
hour schedule. The affidavit was sworn to and filed before any
service had been performed.

The petitions which were filed with it

were in the hands of Miner.

On December 23, 1878, Brady ordered

the trips Increased to three per week on a schedule of ninety-six
hours, thus raising the compensation to

18,612.

Later, in July

1880, the service was made a dally one on a schedule of forty-eight
hours, and the compensation was raised to ,50,166.
In July 1881 two inspectors were sent over the route.

They re

ported that, except for the first twenty miles out of Canyon City,
there was not a residence or cabin of any kind except the stations
that had been built for the accomodation of the mail carriers.

The

gross revenue from the line was found to be 3473.69 in 1880, and
5108.58 in 1881.^

After the report was submitted a study of the

petitions was undertaken.
by a few persons.

It was found that many names were signed

The bulk of the names were, however, secured by

clipping the names from e petition asking for an increase in serv
ice on a route a thousand miles distant and pasting them on to a
Canyon City petition.

Woodward recognized the signature of Nephi

Johnson, whom he knew to be In the city, so he summoned him to the
dapartment offices. Johnson then was able to id ntify his own signa
ture and the signature of many of his neighbors who lived in
Colorado.32
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Another of these particularly incriminating routes was the one
from Mineral Park,Arizona, to Pioche, Nevada.
John W. Dorsey in 1878.

It had been let to

The route was 252 miles in length and one

trip a week was to have been performed on a schedule of eightyfour hours.

The original compensation was

2,982, but by July

1879 it had been raised to ^52,033.^° in order to secure this in
crease petitions were circulated on a route from Mineral Park to
Shernberg and later altered.

It was on this petition that Rerdell

testified that he had interpolated the words **on a schedule of
sixty hours Instead of eighty-four**, but he failed to recall that
the number 40105, which was the number of the Mineral Park to
Ehrenberg route, had been changed to 40104, the number of the
Mineral Park to Pioche route.

However, the erasures on the peti

tion were quite evident, and it was also evident that sll the
signers lived upon the former route.34
In the fall of 1879, a few months after the increase had been
granted time bills were sent through in the pouches on thirty-nine
consecutive days for the purpose of securing an accurate record of
the time consumed in transporting the mail.

The postmaster at

Mineral Park, under a misconception of his instructions, made an
inventory of the contents of each pouch on the time bills.

On

nineteen of the thirty-nine days there was not a single letter or
Paper in the pouch, and the average for the thirty-nine days was
about one letter per day.*"'

The Inspectors who went over the route

in 1881 testified that not one person lived along the route be
tween the two settlements.36
Issac Jennings of St. Thomas, Nevada, took a subcontract on this

-

route.
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His contract was graduated upward depending upon the number

of trips a week performed, but no mention was mads of the speed
the mail was to be carried.
was to receive

28,000.

divided in Washington.

On the basis of six trips per week he

This left a profit of $24,000 to be
Jennings did not see the sense in rushing

an empty mail pouch trough on time so deductions ate up most of his
28,000.

The last quarter

he carried the mail the deductions

amounted to $28,789, which left him Indebted to Dorsey for $789.
Dorsey refused to give him any financial assistance and he was
ruined financially.

He came to Washington in 1881 in an endeavor

to find some recourse against Dorsey, and he became an available
witness against the combination.37
The other Dorsey routes were Just as bad.

The fraud and decep

tion employed on the Mineral Park-Pioche route, and the Canyon CityCamp MacDermitt route are merely examples of the practices on most
of the routes.

The nineteen routes selected to be submitted to the

grand Jury had been let originally for the aggregate sum of -341,135
per annum, and they had been increased to

>448,670, while the re

ceipts of the post offices along these routes which were not al
ready being served by railroads aggregated $11,622 per annum.38
Over half of the increase in compensation was due to the expedition
of the routes, and in many Instances the expedition was patently
fraudulent.

The reports of the postmasters and the time bills sent

through at frequent intervals showed conclusively that many of the
subcontractors, for their own convenience, had always carried the
mail through at as great a speed as they did after the order expedlting the service became effective.

39

It was also discovered
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that many new post offices authorized by the department after
petitions had been presented by Dorsey agents could not be found,
although pro rata increases for carrying the mail to them had been
received by Dorsey.
In preparing the case against Dorsey the government was guided
by the experience of New York state in prosecuting Tweed.

Tweed

was indicted and tried several times on charges of fraud covering
single transactions, but the state was not able to secure his con
viction.

Finally an indictment was sought and secured charging

many acts of fraud and he was convicted.

A reasonable doubt of

his guilt existed when an isolated instance was presented to the
Jury, but when the Jury was given a broader view of his practices
the doubt was removed.
purposely complicated.40

For that reason the case against Dorsey was
Unfortunately such a complicated case

had several inherent weaknesses.

The possibility of delays and

procrastination in the prosecution of the case was enhanced by its
complexity, and that would mitigate in favor of the defendants.
Then too, it would be necessary to summon witnesses from most of
the routes cited in the indictment, and not all of the testimony
would prove to be valuable to the prosecution.

The credibility

of some of the witnesses would be impeached, and others would have
lapses of memory which would appreciably weaken the case.

The

defendants In this case had too much influence and power to hope
that the case could be concluded without some slips of that kind.
Another strong case was developed against senator William Pitt
Kellogg, Brady, and J. B. Price.

J. B. Price was the contractor

on the routes from Monroe to Shreveport, and from San Antonio to
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to Corpus Chrlsti.

The San Antonio-Corpus Chrlsti route had been

let to Price in 1878 for

2,733 per annum.

The route was 148

miles in length, and two trips a week were to be performed on a
forty-eight hour schedule.

Price never performed any of the

service himself, but he sublet the route immediately to J. J. Ellis
for $8,199 per annum.
loss of $5,466 a year.

Thus it appeared that Price would suffer a
However, on August 26, before the route

had been in operation two months, the service was increased to
six trips a week and the compensation was raised to $8,199.

There

was still no profit in the route for Price at that figure, but he
was no longer losing anything.

It was not until July 15, 1879,

when the running time was reduced to twenty-nine and a half hours
and the pay increased to :28,403, that the route became profitable.
Walsh, who was a Washington banker as well aB a mail contractor,
testified that about July 16 or 17 Senator William Pitt Kellogg
gave him five drafts for $3,000 each on the sixth auditor of the
United States against the compensation on the San Antonio-Corpus
Chrlsti route, and also a note for $5,000 drawn by Hugh White and
endorsed by Monroe Salisbury- - in all $20,000.

The drafts were

to be collected by Walsh, one at the end of each of the five sub
sequent quarters, and the note was to be collected at maturity.
The proceeds were to be divided by Walsh, half going to Kellogg and
half to Brady.

Later, in December,1882, Price, on being accepted

as a government witness corroborated Walsh’s testimony, definitely
admitting that the payments were authorized in order to secure the
expedition of the service on that route.

Unfortunately Walsh was

known to have quarreled with both Kellogg and Brady so his testi
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mony was not given much weight until it was corroborated.^
The route from Monroe to Shreveport showed very conclusively
the presence of graft.
for .9,380.

The route had been let to Price in 1878

The length of the route was given as 122|- miles, but

the true length was somewhat less,

seven trips a week were to be

performed on a schedule of thirty-six hours.

On July 8, 1879 the

time was expedited to twenty-nine hours and the compensation was
increased to ^22,367.

Thus the mail was expedited less than a

mile an hour for the exorbitant sum of

12,987.

While no evidence

to show that money had been paid to secure the expedition was ever
obtained, the absurdity of the affidavit upon which the increased
compensation was granted constituted it as prima facia evidence of
fraud.

At that day when everyone was familiar with horse travel,

it must have seemed unreasonable that over twice as many men and
horseB were required to transport the mail at four miles an hour
than were required to transport it at three and a fifth miles an
hour.42
Another relatively simple and well evidenced case was developed
from the transactions connected with the Santa Fe-Prescott route.
George McDonough was the nominal contractor on that route but
Fisher, Kirk, and Hinds were partners in the venture.

In order to

stock the route, and to procure money with which to secure an in
crease, they borrowed $36,000 from Walsh.

$8,000 of this sum was

paid to S.P. Brown, a friend and an associate of Brady’s, by a
draft drawn upon Walsh, and another $8,000 had to be assured by
a draft drawn upon the sixth auditor against the future pay of
the route.

By an increase thus procured, the compensation was

-

raised from
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13,313 to $73,000.43

The route aid not prove to be such a bonanza as the partners
expected, since they found it impossible to pay Walsh.

None of

the partners were experienced in the work, and the interest
charges and the necessity of amortizing the debt over a four year
period, together with having to meet the Brady draft cooled
McDonough’s enthusiasm for the project.

McDonough tentatively

arranged for the transfer of the route to Tarker and Cluggage in
consideration of their assuming the obligations against the route.
Hinds opposed the transfer and threatened to reveal the fraudulent
practices of the department if the deal was consummated.
sult of Hinds’ threats the deal fell through,

As a re

McDonough then as

signed e. subcontract to Walsh. Hinds immediately carried out his
threat with the result that the attention of the newspapers, and
ultimately the attention of Congress, was directed toward this
route.

This occurred in the fall of 1878.

In March 1879 Brady

declared McDonough to be a failing contractor, and concurrently
he reduced the service to its original status.

McDonough’s

sureties, Kirk and Gleason, were then offeree the contract osten
sibly that they might protect themselves.

However It was admitted

that they cpuld not perform the service for $13,313, so they re
fused the contract, since they felt certain that 3rady would not
restore the service if they assumed it because Kirk had sided with
Hinds against M,cDonough.

Walsh was then awarded the contract at

$18,50C, a figure just below the second lowest bid at the last let
ting.

Hinds kept up the quarrel with valsh, and this quarrel de

terred Brady from restoring the service.

After several months of
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operation, during which time Walsh had circulated petitions asking
for an increase in service, Brady finally informed Walsh, through
Elkins, that he need not expect an increase until Hinds was
placated.

As a result Walsh sent for Hinds, and they signed an

agreement whereby Walsh agreed to pay Mrs. Hinds $20,000 in the
event that the compensation on the route was raised to $100,000 or
over."4

Shortly after this agreement was reached the service on

the route was increased and the schedule expedited so that Walsh
was to receive $135,000 per annum. 45
During 1379 Walsh made several payments on his account with
Hinds, but in 1880 Walsh quarreled with Brady and the route ceased
to be profitable.

The quarrel,according to Walsh’s testimony,

originatod through a call from Andrews, a clerk in the sixth
auditor’s office, for a subscription of $8,000 for what he termed
'bongressional business”.

Walsh refused to pay the sum and a short

time later he was summoned to Brady’s office.

Brady there explain

ed to him that the $8,000 was to be contributed to a congressional
fund to secure the passage of the deficiency appropriation then
before Congress.

In addition to the $8,000, $36,000 was declared

to be due for raising the compensation on the route from $73,000
to $135,000, and that in addition he would be assessed fifty per
cent of all fines and deductions which were remitted.

Welsh re

fused to pay anything, and he remonstrated with Brady over what
he held to be unfair and unjustified fines and deductions which
had been levied against him.

Walsh asserted that his only aim

was to recover the $36,000 he had advanced to McDonough, and that
he would gladly surrender the route to anyone who would assume
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thls obligation and reimburse him for the additional sums spent
in stocking the route.
A few days later, Lilley arranged with Walsh to meet seorge
P. Brott, who was considering the purchase of the route.
offered Walsh

Brott

£5,000 for an assignment of the contract, but Walsh

refused to sell unless he would receive $50,000. Brady advised
Brott against the purchase of the route at that price, saying that
if he did not take that price which was offered rthe will wind up
by taking nothing”.

On this point the testimony of Walsh is

cooroborated by the affidavit of Brott.

So there can be no doubt

concerning Walsh’s willingness to dispose of the route at a fair
price, nor of Brady’s attitude toward the transaction,

shortly

after the offer to Brott was mads, Brady ordered a one trip a week
reduction in the service on the route, which automatically carried
with it a pro rata reduction in the compensation amounting to ap
proximately j?20,000 per annum.

A few days later the terminus of

the route was moved from Santa Fe to Alberquerque, cutting off,
according to the order, eighty miles and reducing the pay pro rata.
The animus in this action is clearly Indicated by the fact that
the postal register showed the distance between Santa Fe and
Alberquerque to be thirty-five miles.47

In addition, many flnec

and deductions were ordered which were not Justified by the re
ports of the postmasters.

Finally, in February 1881 Walsh was de

clared to be a failing contractor.
After James became postmaster general and Elmer became the
second assistant, the papers and reports on the route were examined
at Walsh’s request.

As a result he was re-instated and awarded

-

.15,000 In beck pay, and
mitted.
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9,500 In fines and deductions was re

However, the same ord r discontinued the service on the

route since it was deemed unnecessary by the Inspectors, and
Walsh agreed to waive the customary thirty days pay that is
usually granted on the cancellation of a contract.

Later Walsh

attempted to collect the thirty days pay on the grounds that he
understood that he was merely waiving his claim to additional back
48
compensation for which he had put in a claim.
Walsh and Hinds
were both eager to testify against Brady.

Walsh signed an affida-

vlt which implicated Brady, Andrews, Brown, and Lllley.
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The

vulnerable point in the testimony of these men was that they were
testifying out of revenge.
Another valuable witness who agreed to testify was George F.
Brott.

He had

securod two steamboat contracts through the pay

ment of money to William Lllley, the father of the deputy sixth
auditor, after ordinary methods had failed to secure him a contract.
He was also interested in the star route from Santa Fe to Messila,
New Mexico, and he explained how that had been expedited through
payments to Lllley.

He signed and swore to an affidavit to that

effect, and the Uruth of his statement was corroborated by letters
from Lllley wnich he turned over to Voodward.
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His testimony

implicated only the two Liileys.
In the course of tie Investigation ic was discovered th. t fraud
ulent bonds were frequently filed with bids and contracts in the
department.

A number of so called ’’straw bonds'* cases were also

prepared for trial.

No culpability

for any of the straw bonds

rested on any government official, but the cases have been
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popularly included in the star route frauds.

Usually the investi

gation of the bonds was conducted by the district attorney in the
district where the offense occurred, so the facts concerning the
cases or the outcome of most of them is not available.

However,

in Philadelphia the post office inspectors discovered a ring of
star route contractors who had secured numerous bids and contracts
with straw bonds.

One of.the members of this ring owned a few

acres of land in Virginia.

He qualified as a surety for one of

the other members of the ring on the strength of owning this land.
He then transfered this land to another member for the nominal
price of .;r76,000, and the new owner qualified as a surety on
another contract.

This procedure was repeated several times until

these few acres worth a few hundred dollars was used as security
on contracts totalling several hundred thousand dollars.

The ring

did not operate any routes but sold their contracts as soon as pos
sible.

In a few instances large increases in the compensation were

effected before a transfer could be made.

Woodward persuaded

McDevltt, one of the members of the ring, to testify for the
govennment against Brady, since he had made payments to Brady on
several occasions.^1
During the su mer of 1881 as the investigation progressed, cer
tain newspapers became more vitrolic in their attacks on the presi
dent and those officers of his administration in immediate charge
of the star route cases.

The National Republican of Washington

and the Commercial Advertiser of New York appear to have been the
most abusive.

These papers tried to make it appear that the mail

contractors were being persecuted for political reasons, and after
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the confession and subsequent repudiation by Rerdell, they charged
the administration with attempting to suborn witnesses.

Dorsey

and Ingersoll, his attorney, had the effrontery to call on Garfield
and demand the dismissal of MacVeagh on those grounds.53

Garfield

seems not to have considered the charges, but he did suffer from
the attacks of the newspapers.

On June 27 he met James end showed

him a particularly bitter attack in the National Republican rela
tive to the star route investigation.

Garfield then requested

that JaBaes and MacVeagh come to the White House that evening and
consult with him about the cases.54
MacVeagh was out of the city so the consultation had to be post
poned.

On Wednesday, two days later, Garfield became impatient at

the continued absence of MacVeagh so he asked James

to call that

evening and to bring Cook if MacVeagh had not returned.

That

evening, June 29, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the progress
of the cases, and he ordered that some indictments be secured and
tried at an early date.55
On July 2 Garfield was shot and government business, except for
routine matters, was practically paralyzed.

In August Garfield was

moved to Elberon, on the Jersey coast, in the hope that the sea air
might be beneficial to him, and MacVeagh accompanied him there.

On

the day that MacVeagh was leaving he met Corkhill on the steps of
the Department of Justice building.

Corkhill informed him that the

grand jury was being convened on September 12, and he asked MacVeagh
if he would have any star route cases to submit.

MacVeagh replied

that he would have to consult Assistant District Attorney Cook about
that.

Throughout August and the early part of September Cook, Gibson,
and Woodward were at work on cases, one of which they expected to
submit to the September grand jury.

About September 10 Cook took

the briefs of several cases to Elberon for a final consultation
with MacVeagh.

At that conference it was decided to submit the

Santa Fe-Prescott case to the grand Jury at once, and to follow it
with the other cases in October.

Cook returned to Washington on

the morning of September 14 and was greeted with the news that the
grand jury had adjourned.

The grand jury had been in session only

two days and had been adjourned without any warning being given to
the government attorneys who were working on the star route cases.
Corkhill later claimed that MacVeagh had told him that if there
were any star route cases to be submitted he would be notified, but
the government attorneys unanimously expressed the opinion that the
precipitous adjournment of the &rand jury was ordered because of
Corkhill's sympathy for the mail contractors.56

Both MacVeagh and

James, for some reason which is not clear today, distrusted Corkhll],
and they had persuaded Garfield of the need for his removal.

At

the time of the fatal shooting Garfield had tendered the position
to another attorney, and was waiting a favorable reply before ask
ing for Corkhill's resignation.57
After it became apparent that Garfield would not recover, MacVee$i
determined to appoint someone to take charge of the prosecution who
was in political harmony with Arthur.
Philadelphia became his choice.

Benjamin Harris Brewster of

As James was unacquainted with

Brewster, MacVeagh offered to appoint another attorney whom James
would recommend.

As a result George Bliss, ex-United States Dis-
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trlct Attorney of New York, was appointed to assist Brewster. Both
the appointments were made a few days before Garfield’s death.^8
After the appointment of Bliss and Brewster the connection of
Gibson with the cases, for all practical purposes, ceased.

Bliss

and Brewster distrusted both Gibson and Cook, but Cook was allowed
to remain active in the cases for some time.

It was on Cook’s

recommendation that the government counsel decided to proceed with
a case on information.

At first Bliss opposed the suggestion, but

upon further reflection he decided that it was feasible and prac
tical.

However, he selected the case against Lilley, based upon

Brott’s testimony, as the case to be tried instead of the case
arising out of the testimony concerning the Prescott-Santa Fe route
which Cook wanted to try.fc^

Cook was allowed to conduct the hear

ing on the information for the prosecution.

During the course of

the hearing Woodward was the only witness put on the stand, so in
reality Cook was trying to establish the basic facts in the case
by hearsay evidence.

Of course such evidence was not admlssable

and the case was literally laughed out of court.
When the grand Jury re-convened in November Cook was again allow
ed to direct the presentation of tht evidence against Lilley to the
grand Jury.

Although Brott was in the city at that time he was not

called to testify, but a subpoena was issued for Mrs. Brott.

The

testimony she gave incriminated her husband, and indictments were
returned against both Brott and Lilley.

To Brott it appeared that

he had been deliberately double crossed by the government counsel,
so he refused to cooperate any further with them.

The result was

that there was no witness available to the government who could
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convict Lilley on this indictment.
After Arthur became president several changes were made in the
staff of attorneys.

Brewster became the attorney general upon the

resignation of MacVeagh, and Richard T. Merrick, a Democratic
attorney of Washington was retained to take Brewster’s piece.
addition, William W.

In

Kerr, a Democratic member of the Philadelphia

bar, was retained to draw up the indictments.

Thus Bliss, Merrick,

and Kerr represented the government in the prosecution of the
frauds.

Cook and Gibson were nominally associated with the counsel

until March 1882 but they were no longer active.
If the progress of the investigation could be measured by the
number of indictments which were secured a fair measure of success
could be accorded to it.

The first indictment was against Brott

and Lilley to which previous reference has been made.

In March

1882 several indictments were returned against the Dorsey combina
tion, including Brady and Turner.

These indictments charged con

spiracy to defraud on nineteen specified routes.62

in June of

that same year indictments were returned against Price and Brady
charging conspiracy to defraud in connection with the route from
San Antonio to Corpus Christi, and from Monroe to Shreveport.
Although the evidence Implicated Kellogg he was not indicted at
that time, probably because the grand jury was cautioned by Bliss
that "It is a serious matter to indict a member of the United
States Senate."63

However, several months later, after Price had

been accepted as a government witness, Kellogg was indicted.

Brady

and A. H. Brown were indicted for conspiracy in connection with
the letting of the route from Monument to liver Bend, Colorado.
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Many other indictments against lesser offenders were likewise ob
tained, the total number of indictments being somewhat over forty?*
Most of them charged conspiracy to

defraud, but some charged

bribery, the receiving of bribes, or perjury.

Most of the perjury

indictments were secured against contractors who had filed fraudu
lent bonds, out three were returned against contractors who had
made false affidavits.

Those three were Intended to serve as test

cases so that a judicial interpretation of the law could be obtained.

The government failed only in securing Indictments

against the Parker and Salisbury combinations, and against Luke
Voorhees, the contractor on the Fargo Pembina route.®®
Only three of the indictments secured as a result of the investi
gation were ever tried.

The "straw bond" ring which had been un

covered in Philadelphia was tried and all the defendants were
convicted and sentenced.

Even MacDevitt, who had been accepted as

a government witness by Woodward, with the acquiescence of MacVeagh
and James, was forced to serve a year in the federal prison,
Brewster having declined to interfere with the sentence.®'7
The next case to be tried was the one against the Dorsey com
bination.

The indictments in this case charged S. W. Dorsey,

J. W. Dorsey, Brady,Peck, Valle, Miner, Rerdell, and Turner with
conspiracy to defraud the government on nineteen counts.

This

case was the most important of all since the conviction of Dorsey
and Brady would make it much easier to secure other convictions.
Moreover, Dorsey and Brady symbolized either graft or persecution
to the american public, so their conviction was necessary to make
the investigation a success.
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The probabilities of the successful prosecution of the case
were lessened by legal technicalities and delays from the very
outset.

The first indictment, which had been secured in March

1882, was faulty in that it named Rerdell by his intials only
and cited Valle by the name of Henry instead of Harvey which was
his Christian name.08

A

new indictment was secured in May, and

three weeks of argument over the legality of the instrument en
sued.

Finally Judge Wylie preemptorlly ended the argument and

set the date of the trial for June 1.

f .Q

After the trial was

begun the arguments over the admissibility of the evidence were
so frequent and so protracted that the trial consumed the whole
summer. 70
The case as it was presented in court was strongly indicative
of the guilt of the defendants, but to the legal mind it may have
appeared a little weak on evidence to establish conspiracy to
defraud.

Twice during the trial Judge Wylie called for evidence
71
with which to substantiate the conspiracy charge.
Finally, as
a last resort, Walsh was summoned to the stand.

He

could not

testify to any of the overt acts cited in the indictment, but he
could testify that he had been assessed by Brady and that Brady
had assured him that all contractors paid for any increased which
were ordered.

This testimony seems to have fulfilled all the

legal requirements for in the charge to the Jury the Judge prac
tically ordered that a verdict of guilty be returned.

However,

on September 11, the jury returned a verdict which found Rerdell
and Miner guilty, but they failed to agree on the other defen
dants.72
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The vordict was a gross miscarriage
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of justice.
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Berdell was

secretary to Dorsey, and all the profits he derived from the
Dorsey routes, with the exception of one or two small route® upon
which he became the c mtrector, was through the salary which
Dorsey paid him.

Miner was a member of the ring but his interest

In It was not large, nor did he have much voice In the policies
or management of Its Interests.

The personnel of the ring and the

interest which each held was admitted, so it was known to the Jury
that S. W* Dorsey and Valle held the controlling Interest.

Min r

end Rerdell, therefore, could not conceivably have been guilty
If the others were innocent.

The verdict was so absurd that

Merrick requested that it be set aside end the date for a new trial
sat.73
The second trial began December 7, and It continued till June
4, 1883,
case.

At this trial the government presented a much stronger

Following his conviction at the first trial Rerdell again

agreed to become a witness.

The sixty-six page confession which

he signed preceding the second trial was a much more elaborate and
incriminating document than the one he had signed previously. The
force of his testimony was weakened during the trial, however, when
the attorneys were suddenly confronted with a second repudiation,
the existence of which they had never suspected until it was pre
sented in court.

Rerdell subsequently repudiated this repudiation,

but the credibility of his testimony was somewhat Impeached.74 The
for 8 of his testimony, though, so well authenticated by letters
and documents, and corroborated In almost every detail by thirtythree witnesses, was so strong that It could not be Ignored or

-
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In addition the case of the prosecution

was strengthened by the testimony of Price, which was pErtlcularly damning to Brady.

In all, the evidence presented at the

second trial seemed even more conclusive than at the first.

How

ever, on June 4, 1883, after over six months of listening to evi
dence, the Jury brought in a verdict of not guilty for each of the
75
defendants.
The acceptance of Price as a witness resulted in the Indictment
of Kellogg on a charge of receiving pay for practicing before a
department while he was an officer of the United S t a t e s . W a l s h
had testified before two grand Juries in 1882 but neither jury had
indicted Kellogg.

Now that Price was a government witness who

could and would substantiate Walsh*s testimony in regard to the
$20,000 paid Kellogg for securing the Increase on the San AntonioCorpus Christi route, there was no alternative but to re-open the
case.
Unfortunately the statute of limitations terminated on this
charge in July 1882 if the date upon which the drafts were handed
to Kellogg was held to be the date upon which Kellogg was paid.
Howev r, since the drafts were not negotiable instruments, and
since the last draft was not paid until September 30, 1880, it
was hoped, and confidently expected that the court would sustain
the indictment. ^

The trial of the case was begun in October,

the Judge overruling a motion to quash the indictment.

Later in

the trial he practically reversed himself by ruling that the pay
ment must be considered as having been made in July, and thus
78
Kellogg escaped punishment.
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Chapter IV
THE FAILURE OF THE INVESTIGATION

Many factors enter into the failure to secure conviction in the
prosecution of the star route frauds.

It is certain that many who

escaped punishment were guilty, but the reasons why and how they
escaped have never been made clear.

In 1884 a special committee

was appointed by the House to investigate the expenditures of the
Department of Justice and the failure of the star route cases.
was successful in bringing some facts to light.

It

In its report the

committee acknowledged, however, that the investigation was not a
thorough one.

The thirty-eight witnesses who testified before it

suggested numerous reasons for the failure of the prosecution, but
the committee did not go very deeply into any of them.

The evi

dence supporting many of the points was strong, and a more thorough
investigation should have been made.

The report of the majority

suggested that had the committee more time, they would have made an
investigation into the charges that the Dorsey jury was bribed.

As

it stood their report effectively white-washed several more perti
nent leads which they had uncovered.^- The minority report which
ascribed the failure to the "magnitude of interests and to defects
h

in the criminal statutes,

came much nearer the truth if the em

phasis is placed on the former cause.2
The most Important factor in the failure of the case was the
pervasiveness of the fraud.

Many men in high places were involved.

S. W. Dorsey was an ex-Senator from Arkansas and secretary of the
National Republican Committee.

He seemed to be on intimate terms
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#lth most of the leading Republicans in the country, and Garfield
had consulted him concerning the formation of his cabinet.^
Kellogg was a Republican Senator from Louisiana at the time of his
indictment,and his party had a majority of but one in the Senate,
prady was also prominent in party councils.

It is probable that

a number of other prominent men were involved although they never
publicly been implicated.

e know that S. B.

Elkins, a Congress

ional Delegate from New Mexico, seemed unduly interested in star
route affairs.

Walsh testified that Elkins called on him in 1879

and suggested that it would be wise to placate Hinds if he wanted
his route expedited.

4

Dorsey also stated that it was Elkins who

warned him of Rerdell's first confession.^

Another Senator, whose

name has been deleted from the published confession, called Rerdell
in an effort to induce him to repudiate his affidavit and later,
]
after Dorsey had arrived from New York, he called on Rerdell in
company with Dorsey and succeeded in persuading Rerdell to do so.
Merrick volunteered the information to the committee that when he
first became associated with the government counsel he was shown a
list of congressmen and senators who were supposed to have profited
7
by the star route legislation.
The fact that neither he, nor
anyone else, were ouestioned about this list suggests the fact that
this list was well known.
The testimony of others point to the fact that the contractors
were assessed and a fund raised to secure liberal appropriations
for Btar route service.

While the evidence on this point was by

no means conclusive, it was known that one such fund was subscribed
in 1879 to secure the passage of the deficiency appropriation bill.
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Valsh testified that he had been assessed ,$8,000 by Brady for such
a fund in that year.

8

Price in his sworn statement testified that

he had been assessed for the fund, end that he had paid his assess
ment.

Woodward testified that there was such a fund, but that he
a
only knew about it in a general way.
The testimony of Walsh and Price might conceivably be impeached.

Walsh1s motives in testifying may not have been altogether unselfish.
*
Price was a close friend of Walsh, and he was testifying to prevent
the Indictment against himself from being tried.

How ever,the

assertion of Woodward’s cannot be lightly dismissed.

He was an

experienced investigator, and he understood the significance of
his assertion.

All his associates spoke highly of his work, and he

was the only one who emerged from the Investigation without being
charged with a share in the responsibility for the failure of the
cases.
The political preferment shown at least two persons involved
in the frauds further indicates that they had the support or
acquiescence of a powerful political group.

Ray P. Eaton, who had

been the assistant railway mail superintendent in immediate charge
of all star routes, had been removed by James for "negligence if
not w o r s e " . S h o r t l y after his removal he was appointed collector
of customs in Maine.

Such an important political appointment could

not have been made in that state without the endorsement of James
G. Blaine.

A similar case may be found in the appointment of

Charles H. Dickson to a position in the Department of Interior.
Previous to his appointment he had been Indicted for perjury which
he committed when he became the surety on several hundred thousand
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dollars worth of mail contracts.
evidenced, was never tried.

This indictment, which was well

11

Another indication that the frauds had the support of a powerful
group is found in the fact that most of the Washington papers, and
many powerful papers in other cities, opposed the Investigation.
At times they ridiculed it, but more often they roundly abused the
officers who were conducting it.

Among the charges made by those

papers against the prosecution may be mentioned political perse
cution, suborning witnesses, and plotting to steal private papers
and records.

The National Republican, In which Brady owned consid

erable stock, and which was supposed to be the administration organ,
was one of the most abusive of the Washington papers.

The position

of this paper was so pronounced before the first Dorsey trial,
that Bliss bought an interest in it in an endeavor to change its
policy.

12

This attitude of the local press succeeded in creating

an adverse public opinion in Washington which was a major factor
in the failure of the prosecution.
Still another evidence of the "magnitude of interests" was the
number of government officers and employees who attempted to
obstruct the investigation.

The work of Corkhill, the United States

district attorney in vvashlngton, has already been cited.

He was

slated for removal at the time Garfield was shot, but Arthur deter
mined to make no change in the office until the prosecution of
Glteau was concluded, so he was allowed to complete his term.'*''* The
United States marshall for the District, the postmaster and
assistant postmaster of Washington, the foreman of the Congressional
Record, and several lesser employees of the various departments
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wer© removed from office because they expressed themselves publicly,
]&
in rash end abusive terms, as being in sympathy with the defendants.
Kerr testified that the counsel for the prosecution could not. trust
the marshals of the various states to serve subpoenas on witnesses,
awl they were forced to employ special agents for that work,

1A

It

doe© not seem reasonable that Dorsey, Brady, end Kellogg could
alone have commanded the support of such a large section of the
press, to say nothing of the known sympathy of so many government
officials.
A second factor In the failure of the investigation was the
generally accepted theory that the administration did not want to
convict,17

The Congressional committee sifted this charge pretty

thoroughly but they failed to discover that there was any ground
for the rumor.

As fare s Garfield, Jamas, ’
iacVeagh and Brewster

were concerned no act or utterance
such a charge.

of

theirs gave any basis for

MacVeagh testified In regard to Garfield as follows;

"Of course it would not b© telling the whole truth to be silent
upon the fact that those prosecutions were a source of very great
anxiety, and I might also say, at certain stages of them, of dis
tress to President Garfield. It would have been very strange if
it had been otherwise; and I have no doubt at times gentlemen may
have felt that there were other methods of correcting these wrongs
than the methods General James and I were pursuing."13
His reference here was to an incident which occurred early in
the investigation when Dorsey and Ingersoll had called on Garfield
to persuade him to order a non-judical investigation for Dorsey.
Garfield referred the matter to James who declined to make an ex
ception in the Dorsey case, but there is some evidence

that con

siderations of friendship, and political obligations, may have
induced Garfield to w a v e r . H o w e v e r , he accepted the decision of
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James, and as far as the puolic was concerned, he never gave any
indication of wanting to spare anyone.
Brewster, although he was the attorney general at the time of
the trials, took an active part in the first Dorsey trial, because
he thought that his presence in the courtroom might, convince the
public of the sincerity of the prosecution.

He made the final plea

to the Jury, and in that plea he condemned Dorsey in no uncertain
terms.

20

Brewster was also responsible for the indictment of

Kellogg,which, of course, hinged upon the acceptance of Price as a
government witness. Bliss opposed the testimony of Price, but
Merrick favored it, and it was referred to idrewster.^1
But there were several considerations that seemed to support the
theory that the administration did not wish to convict Dorsey and
Kellogg.

Dorsey had co-operated in the campaign to elect Garfield.

He always claimed that without his help Garfield could not have
been elected.

22

This was probably an exaggerated claim, but at

the conclusion of the campaign a dinner was tendered Dorsey in
New York by prominent Republicans, and at this dinner Arthur made a
speech eulogizing Dorsey.^

ihen Dorsey became involved in the

investigation the papers gave wide publicity to the dinner and to
Arthur's speech.

It was made to appear that neither Garfield or

Arthur could seriously wish for the conviction of Dorsey, or be
lieve that he was guilty.

In a city as policically minded as

Washington this public opinion placed the prosecution at a con
siderable disadvantage in securing

indictments and convictions.

The blunders of Bliss, if we accept a charitable view of them,
greatly aggravated the situation.

There was considerable testi

mony purporting to show that Bliss did not desire to convict either
Dorsey or Kellogg.

Regarding Bliss1 attitude toward Dorsq/ , Ker

testified that Merrick had informed him during thr progress of the
first trial that Bliss had requested that Dorsey be let off.

"He

sayB we can convict the rest, but he wants to let Dorsey go",
Merrick was quoted as saying.24

Merrick on the stand censured Ker

for revealing professional confidences, but, while he denied any
such conversation as Ker attributed to him, he said: "While I do
not believe that Bliss would be dellquent in his duty, yet I be
lieved that in his heart he did desire that Dorsey might not be
convicted."
The closing arguments for the prosecution in the first Dorsey
trial were made by Ker, Bliss, Merrick, and Brewster in the order
named.

Bliss in his summary failed to mention Dorsey by name.26

At the conclusion of his argument he left for New York, and upon
his arrival there, the following dispatch appeared, quoting Bliss:
"Mr. Ingersoll, I think will find out before the trials are over
that the cases contained a good deal of meat for the government.
The one against Mr. Dorsey, defended by the brilliant Colonel, is
admitted to be the weakest of the lot, but in all others a verdict
for the prosecution is confidently looked for, and even that may be
decided in the same way."'2?
The defendants’ counsel, of course adverted to the fact that
Bliss had failed to stress Dorsey’s guilt in his closing argument
as evidence that the government did not wish to convict him.
Wilson is quoted from the court record as saying:
"My brother Merrick has a great deal to say about newspapers....
Well the newspapers as It happened saw the very wide difference
that existed between Mr. Merrick and Mr. Bliss upon this subject,
and one of them went so far as to say that they were going to watch
and see whether the learned Attorney-General was going to side with
Bliss in saying that there was not much of a sprlrkle so far as
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Dorsey was concerned, or whether he was going to side with Merrick,
and say that it was a flood so far as Dorsey was concerned. And
that brought out this (taking up a newspaper clipping) - At that point he was interrupted by an objection from Brewster which
P8
was sustained.
He failed in his attempt to get the Bliss inter
view before the jury, but it was in the papers and the Jurors may
have seen it.
Bliss, in testifying before the Congressional committee, claimed
that he had been misquoted.

He admitted saying that the case

against Dorsey had been weakened by the exclusion of testimony in
court.

29

He added, also, that when he had made the statement he

did not know he was being interviewed.

It is quite probable that

the blunder may have been unintentional on his part, but intention
al or unintentional, It placed the prosecution at a considerable
disadvantage.
Bliss fostered the impression that the government did not wish
to convict Dorsey in still another way.
dinner in New York,

He had attended the Dorsey

MacSweeney, another member of the dependants’

counsel, alluded to the dinner in his plea to show the good
character and standing of Dorsey before the investigation w as be
gun.

He then showed the jury a souvenir menu of the dinner with

the name Greorge Bliss written conspicuously on it.

The objection

of the prosecution to this exhibit was sustained since it had not
been offered in evidence before, but tfte idea was conveyed to the
Jury regardless of the record.
Bliss later admitted that the menu was his.

He said that

McSweeney had told him that he intended to refer to the Dorsey
dinner and to his presence at it.

Bliss had brought the menu into
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court intending to explain the incident in his closing remarks,
but in the rush of closing he forgot to do so.

When he left the

court room he claimed to have left the menu with other papers on
his table, but he did not explain how it came into McSweeney’s
possession.
Both Brewster and Merrick in their closing remarks neglected
the other defendants in order to stress Dorsey’s relationship to
the conspiracy.

Brewster cited the fact that Dorsey’s name appeared

in the evidence ninety-six timeB in connection with the nineteen
routes.

He argued that Dorsey more than anyone else was the head

and front of the whole conspiracy, but his argument failed to
secure a verdict from the Jury.3i:

It is perhaps too much to say

that the failure of the Jury to convict was due to the blunders of
Bliss, but in a close case such as this his concduct night material
ly affect the outcome.
The record of the part Bliss payed in the indictment of Kellogg
is even less creditable than his record against Dorsey.

The Brady,

Price, Kellogg case was first submitted to the grand jury in 1682.
Ker testified that he had prepared an indictment for the three
parties, but the jury indicted only Price and Brady at that time,
although Walsh testified before the jury against Kellogg.

During

the summer of that year, when the government was in need of a
witness who could testify to the fraudulent practices of Brady,
Woodward suggested that Walsh be put on the stand.

Merrick later

testified that up to that time no person had told him about the
Walsh testimony or affidavit, and he was greatly surprised that
such valuable testimony had not been used.

Merrick Immediately got
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in touch with Walsh, but he found that Walsh did not feel disposed
to testify because he claimed that Bliss had cast reflections on
his character before the grand jury and in newspaper interviews.
However, Merrick prevailed on him to testify on the condition
that the grand jury should be re-convened and the Kellogg evidence
again submitted to them.

Bliss readily assented to this agree

ment, and he requested the j ldge to re-convene the grand Jury.33
Accordingly, the grand Jury met in the middle of July 1882.

It

was imperative that the Indictment should be returned immediately
since by the statute of limitations no action could be taken after
the following Monday.

When Bliss examined Walsh before the grand

Jury one of the Jurors asked Walsh several pointed questions.

He

appealed to Bliss as to whether or not he should answer one of the
questions.

Bliss replied: "I think you should .... It is a serious

matter to indict a Senator of the United States, 34

At the con

clusion of Walsh’s testimony Bliss announced that he understood
that Price would be in the city on the following day, and that he
would appear for the government.
cannot now be known.

Just what he did say to the jury

He claimed that he had said that the govern

ment would like to have Price for a witness, but the jurors testi
fying before the Congressional committee two years later, were
positive that he had said that Price would appear.

For that

reason they adjourned for another day instead of deciding the case
immediately, and adjourning sine die.

Hutchinson, the foreman

of the jury, testified that he was under the impression, that Bliss
believed that Price’s testimony would be
to indict Kellogg,

necessary if the Jury was

However, he could not be sure of j st what
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Bllss had said beyond the fact that Price would be there.36

His

testimony was corroborated by five members of the jury.
On the following day Price did not appear, and, as no explana
tion was given, they thereupon adjourned without returning an in
dictment.

At that time no one of the investigators had been in

touch with Price, although some effort had been made to locate
him.

In December of the same year Price requested to be accepted

as a government witness, but Bliss opposed it.
then referred

The question was

to Brewster who decided that Woodward should be

directed to take Price's

statement, and if the statement was satis

factory, he should be accepted as a

witness.

^

A few days later

Woodward notified the counsel that Price had been accepted.

Bliss

declared himself offended that Price had been accepted against his
advice, and he gave notice that he would immediately withdraw from
70

the cases.

He did remain away from the courtroom one day, but

the following day Merrick prevailed on him to return.
No satisfactory explanation has been offered to show why Bliss
desired to have Price for a witness in July, but opposed it in
December.

In December Price's testimony would have been a valuable

acquisition to the second Dorsey trial, and it would

still be

valuable against Kellogg if a reasonable interpretation of the law
would be sustained.

It seems fair to conclude that Bliss did not

want to convict either Dorsey or Kellogg.

He only used Price as a

means of conveying to the grand jury that Walsh's testimony, unless
supported by that of Price, was not adequate.
Bliss was also responsible for the selection of the Dorsey case
as the one to be tried f i r s t . T h i s was an important matter since
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a failure in this case would mitigate against the success of all
the other cases.

Other cases were at least as well supported, and

certainly less complicated than the Dorsey case.

For instance, no

less than five affidavits rare on file at the beginning of the
Dorsey case which would have constituted direct evidence against
Brady or Lilley on charges of receiving bribes.

A case against

either of these two men could have been disposed of in a dnort time
with very probable success, and it would have created a public
opinion which would have made convictions on the Dorsey indictment
far easier to obtain.
Bliss defended his choice of cases by pointing out that the
Dorsey case was a strong one, which it admittedly was.

The records

of the department supplied conclusive evidence of fraud which made
the case less dependent upon the testimony of such witnesses as
were testifying out of revenge or to escape prosecution, for that
type of a witness might be bought at any time.40

Bliss manifested

a distrust, especially of Walsh, but generally speaking, of all
4]
such witnesses, which he publicly acknowledged on several occasions.
His distrust of such testimony rendered it less creditable to the
public.

Later Bliss attempted to justify his view by pointing out

that it was only after great difficulty that Walsh was

finally -

served with a subpoena to testify during the second Dorsey trial.
The opinion Bliss expressed with respect to his reliance on
witnesses did not originate in the caution of a successful district
attorney, which^Bliss w s reputed to be.

State witnesses play far

too important a part in the successful careers of prosecuting
attorneys for any such deep seated prejudices to prevail,

no

one

-
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of his associates shared this distrust with him.

In the case of

Walsh all testified that he told a frank, straightforward story,
42

and that he always seemed ready to help.
attempt to avoid being subpoenaed

It is true that he did

during the second trial, but in

the light of the treatment he received after he testified in the
first trial he can hardly be censured for that.

For that testimony

he had been libelously attacked in the editorial columns of the
National Republican and in the Critic.43
and liar were freely applied to him.

Such epithets as ghoul

He felt that it was incumbent

upon the government to protect their witnesses from criminal libel,
and Merrick agreed with him.

Evidence

was collected and Corkhill

was requested to prosecute the papers that had attacked
no action was ever begun.44

him, but

As a result V/alsh refused to cooperate

any further in the government cases.
The testimony taken b/ the committee carries the implied charge
that Bliss may have been responsible, in a measure at least, for
the Salisburys and Parkers excaping prosecution.

The reports of

the postal inspectors show their routes to be as fraudulent as any,
The department files pertaining to the Salisbury routes had been
stripped of many important papers, and

both Woodward and Bliss

charged that it was Gibson who was responsible for thls.4^

The

loss of these papers would have handicapped the prosecution of the
case before a petty Jury, but there was still ample evidence with
which to secure an indictment.

Before the case was submitted to

the grand Jury, Ingersoll, on behalf of the Salisbury and Parker
interests, suggested that a board be appointed to arbitrate the
government claims against those per ties in lieu of criminal prose-

-

cation.
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At that time the proposal was refused.

the cases before the grand j try.

Bliss then took

On the evening before the grand

Jury was to adjourn Bliss claimed that he was informed that it
would not return indictments in these cases.

In order to salvage

what he could from the Salisburys, as the statute of limitations
would run out before another grand jury convened, he got in touch
with Ingersoll immediately and signed an agreement whereby a
board of three, consisting of Lyman, the second assistant post
master general, Ingersoll,and Bliss, should determine the amount
which the S' llsburys should refund to the g o v e r n m e n t L a t e r a
similar agreement was made withe Parkers.

The board never met to

determine the amount which the government should receive because
Brewster was never convinced of the legality of the arbitration.
Brewster was no doubt correct in his interpretation of the law,
since section 3469 of the revised statutes explicitly states that
suits pertaining to matters of the post office department cannot
47
be compromised.
on the other hand, the good faith of the con
tractors cannot be questioned since they, sjmetime after the agree
ment had been signed, offered to put up bond to secure the payment
of any amount which the board should determine.48
The part that Bliss played in the failure of the trials is hard
to appraise.

Ker, aside from Cook and Gibson, whose testimonies

are not given much weight, was the only member of the counsel who
tried to shift much of the responsibility to Bliss.

He testified

however, that:
"Colonel Bliss is a shrewd, sharp, keen lawyer of great ability and
untiring, energy, and he handled the papers and the testimony in the
case in a manner that was simply wonderful. I do not pretend that
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I could have mastered the cases and the papers as he mastered them.
I think that his services in that respect were invaluable." y
The testimony of both Merrick and Brewster substantiated Ker in
that estimate.

No one intimated that Bliss1 influence had been

bought, but the inference

appears repeatedly in the testimony of

Merrick and Ker that they considered that his Judgement was in
fluenced by political considerations, and by friendships.

Bliss

was a stalwart, and so was Dorsey, and each had been active in
party politics, and it is those political considerations which no
doubt unconsciously influenced Bliss.

In most cases such an atti

tude would be disastrous, but in this case so many other circum
stances conspired to defeat Justice that the part Bliss played was
negligible.
Colonel Cook must also be charged with a share in the responsi
bility for the failure of the cases.

The apprehensions of GarfMcJs

friends over the appointment of Cook seem to have been amply
Justified.

Rerdell in his first affidavit confessed that Cook,

who at that time was still an active member of the government
counsel, had had close connections with Dorsey for some time, and
that Dorsey showed great elation when it was announced that Cook
had been retained by the government.

50

At the time Cook left the government service he had in his
possession papers and testimony relative to sixteen of the nine
teen routes upon which the Dorsey Indictment was based.

On March

7, the day Cook formally retired, Bliss wrote to him asking for
the return of the papers.

Cook denied having them.

Finally, after

several more letters had been written, the papers were returned
on March 28.51

They were held by Cook, no doubt, to be copied.
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This was indicated several times during the trial when the cross
examination of the defense counsel showed that they had had access
to the papers of the prosecution.52

It was further substantiated

by an affidavit from Mrs. Gregg, who testified that she had copied
a large number of papers relative to the star routes for Cook, and
Cook had cautioned her not to let Woodward or any other asaber of
the counsel know anything about it.5*5
The indications are that Cook’s perfidy extended beyond the
Dorsey cases.

Woodward testified that the elder Lilley had in-

formed him that Cook and Gibson were selling government papers.

I
He

also stated that his son had purchased immunity from Cook for 1,Q0C^
and that on the morning that Cook conducted Lilley’s preliminary
54
hearing he was paid ;j>200 of that amount.
Of course this was just
hearsay testimony, and the elder Lilley was no longer living at the
time of the Congressional hearings, but it off rs the only logi
cal explanation for Cook’s conduct of the case against Lilley.
Cook was conceded to be the most successful criminal lawyer in
Washington, yet he attempted to proceed against Lilley on an information based upon the hearsay testimony of Woodward, and later,
when the case

wsb

submitted to the grand Jury, he neglected to use

Brott’s testimony, who had been accepted as a government witness
for this case.

Instead of using his testimony, he had him in

dicted with Lilley, thus offending Brott so that he later refused
to testify at all.
A large contractor, J. D. Colegrove, testified that he had
retained C. C. Cole, Cook's partner, for the expressed purpose of
preventing an indictment from being returned against himself.55

-
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Colgrove’s testimony did not implicate Cook, but the testimony of
Coleman did so, end he was Colgrove's friend and legal advisor.
He testified that It was he who had suggested the retention of
Cole, and that Colgrove had commissioned him to approach Cole re
lative to the matter.

Coleman called on Cole, and after he had

stated the purpose of his call, Cole retired to Cook’s office.
He returned in a few minutes and said that it could be arranged.
As a result Cole was retained for a fee of $500, and Colegrove was
never indicted.
Gibson, like Cook, also seems to have been faithless.

Rerdell

in his affidavits said that in 1880 Dorsey had made Gibson a
present of 1,500 shares of mining stock valued at ^2,000.

When

Rerdell expressed surprise that such a gift should be made to the
man so largely responsible for the Congressional investigation of
1879, Dorsey acknowledged Gibson’s responsibility but added, ”He’s
all right now, aid a good friend of mine.”57
It was not until the fall of 1881 that Gibson’s associates gegan to suspect that he and Cook were selling government pqp ers,
ut actual proof wasnever obtained.
remained an entirely circumstantial

The case against Gibson, too,
one.

During the early part

of the investigation Gibson advocated building up a case against
the Salisbury combination.

In the fall his attitude seems to

have undergone a change, and this was so pronounced that it was
58
noticed b/ his associates.
soon after Woodward and Bliss both
noticed that the files on the Salisbury routes were greatly dlminished, and many papers valuable to the prosecution were missing.

59

Gibson also seemed unduly interested in preventing the prosecution
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of the contractors on the Phoenix-Prescott route.

Woodward testi

fied that the elder Lilley told him that Gibson had received a sum
of money to prevent the prosecution of the fraud on that route.
With his suspicions thus aroused he went to the files for that
route and found the following recommendation under Gibson's signa
ture:
"There is no proof of fraud in this case. There are suspicious
circumstances such as the advertisement of the route as 140 miles
long when in reality it is only 108 miles, and the bid of $680 ,
and the subsequent raising to $32,640; but in the first instance,
the advertisement of the distance as greater than it really is,
the contractor cannot be held responsible for the laches of the
Post Office Department; and in the second place, while the enormous
increase of price is suspicious, stillQthe department cannot base
its action on mere suspicion......."
The Phoenix-Prescott route was as odious aa any route.

It had

been let at a price so low that the contractor could not hope to
perform the service without a loss.

The route ran through a

desert country so the contractor could not Intelligently expect
that the country would be built up thus requiring an increased
service.

However, the service was increased to a daily one, and

the running time was expedited so that the compensation was in
creased to ,32,640.

$27,880 of the total compensation was paid

for expediting the route from 1.08 miles per hour to 3.25 miles
per hour.

No horse could walk as slow as the originally stipulated

speed, and few horses would have any trouble walking 3.25 miles
per hour, yet Gibson reported that there was no proof of fraud on
this route.6'*’
No accurate estimate can be made of the extent of the crooked
operations of either Cook or Gibson, tr their responsibility for
the failure of the investigation.

Each of them played an import-

-
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ant part In the preliminary work, especially Gibson.

In the early

stages they had ample opportunity to betray the government.

In

the fall of 1381, after Woodward began to suspect them, the combin
ation of the vault in which the files were stored was changed so
that neither could have access to any of the papers without first
&2
applying to Woodward.
Gibson’s opportunity to be of any further
aid to the defendants ceased at that time, but it was after that
that Cook handled the Lllley case.

Brewster was reluctant to dis

miss either of them, and it was not until MacVeagh dropped a hint
to Gibson that his services were no longer desired that their resignations were submitted.
Regardless of the lack of enthusiasm displayed by Bliss in
attempting to convict Dorsey and Kellogg, and in ^>ite of the
perfidy of Gibson and Cook, the Dorsey case as it was twice pre
sented to the juries pointed clearly at the guilt of the defen
dants.

Merrick testified that he had never presented a more con

vincing case to a jury.6"* Woodward asserted that the case, in
spite of its failure, would stand as a monument to the efficiency
and thoroughness of the postal inspectors.65

Brewster and Ker

were j st as positive of the conclusiveness of the testimony.66
Bliss, as has been previously mentioned, believed that the exclu
sion of testimony by the court had weakened the case against
Dorsey, but he believed that the evidence against the others
demonstrated their guilt.

Judge Wylie must also have thought so,

for, according to comment in the Nation, which has already been
cited, he came as close to directing a verdict of guilty as he
could without exceeding his prerogatives.

In view of this test!-
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mo ny the Jury must be charged with a measure of responsibility
for the outcome.

The charge was made

in the press that the

foreman of the first Jury had been approached by an agent of the
D partment of Justice, and an attempt made to bribe him.

The

facts are not clearly stated in the testimony, but they seemed to
be familiar to everyone at that time.

Brewster testified that he

had caused an investigation to be made of the charges and that he
had found them entirely groundless.

7

Bliss, on the other hand,

intimated that a further investigation of the charge might show
that there was some truth in it.
No conclusion is justified in view of the meagre testimony re
garding the bribery charge.

It seems that this particular charge

was groundless, but certainly the situation was pregnant with the
possibility of bribery.

The calibre of both juries was low, and
69
this is especially true of the second one.
The defendants had

ample financial resources, and they had many friends, even in the
government service, who might have beai willing to undertake the
work of reaching some member of the jury for them.

The forming of

a contact with a member of the Jury would not have been difficult
since neither Jury was kept in confinement during the trial.
The failure of the government to push other cases after the
Dorsey or kellogg cases were disposed of, or to begin civil suits
for the recovery of money expended under the fraudulent orders of
Brady, has been laid to the pending investigation of the House
into the expenditures of the Department of Justice.

Brewster

testified that the regular staff was already taxed to its capacity,
and that he did not feel justified at that time in retaining any
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He also stated that he did not believe that

civil suits would be practicable so far as re-imbursing the
government was concerned since Judgements against most of the
contractors would be valueless, and the bonds, since they were
determined by the amount of the original contract, would jr oduce
relatively small amounts.
No investigation has been made into the fees paid by the
Department of Justice beyond those paid in the star route cases by
the writer, but certainly these were large enough to excite the
suspicion that the lawyers also were plundering the government.
The fees paid to the attorneys prosecuting the star route cases
totalled $144,846.

Of that amount Bliss received $57,732, Merrick

$37,500, Ker $31,914, Cook $7699, Gibson $5,000 and Brewster
72
$5,000.
At least one of the attorneys, Bliss, received addi
tional fees for service in other goverhment cases during that
same period.
One other factor played a large part in the failure of the investigation.
ities.

The government was handicapped by legal technical

Because of these the cases could not be presented in their

simplest form.

It was imposs1ble to bring action charging perjury

in the making of afflaa/Ita because it was thought by all the
staff that such an action would not be sustained by the court, the
making of a false affidavit never having been defined as perJury
Likewise there was no basis in.law for bringing an action charging
74
fraud.
As a result the indictments had to charge conspiracy to
defraud, or the giving or receiving of bribes.

It is a well known

fact that ceses charging conspiracy to defraud are very difficult

-
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to prove, since not only the fraud but the collusion must be
proved.

The charge of giving or receiving bribes provedes a re

latively simple case, but it was necessary to have evidence of
the actual financial transactions involved.

To sustain an action

of this kind it was usually necessary to grant immunity to one
party in order to secure testimony against the other.

Had Bliss

been more disposed to accept and use government witnesses,
actions of this type, had they been tried, might have proved more
successful.
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Appendix

Table I

Postal Statistics by Five Year Averages.
Year

No.of PostOffices

Length of
Post Roads

Receipts

,xpenditures

1790

75

1,875

37,935

32,140

1795

453

13,207

160,520

117,893

1800

903

20,817

280,804

213,994

1805

1,558

31,076

421,373

377,367

1810

2,300

36,406

551,684

495,969

1815

3,000

43,748

1,043,065

748,121

1820

4,500

72,492

1,111,927

1,160,926

1825

5,677

94,052

1,306,525

1,229,043

1830

8,450

115,176

1,919,300

1,959,109

1835

10,770

112,774

3,152,376

2,585,108

1840

13,468

155,739

4,543,521

4,718,235

1845

14,183

143,930

4,439,841

4,320,731

1850

18,417

178,672

5,499,984

5,212,953

The above table was compiled by Postmaster General Hall and
included in the annual report of 1851. Cong. Globe, 32 Cong.,
1 sess., appendix,25.
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Table II
Postal Statistics 1851 - 1884
Year
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883

No.of POBtOffices
19,796
20,901
22,320
23,548
24,410
25,565
26,586
27,977
28,539
28,498
28,586
28,875
29,047
28,878
20,550
23,828
25,163
26,481
27,106
28,492
30,045
31,863
33,244
34,294
35,547
36,383
37,345
39,258
40,855
42,989
44,521
46,231
47,858

Receipts
6,410,604
5,184,527
5,240,725
6,255,586
6,642,136
6,920,822
7,353,952
7,486,793
7,968,484
8,518,067
8,349,296
8,299,821
11,163,790
12,438,254
14,556,159
14,386,986
15,237,027
16,292,601
18,344,511
19,772,221
20,037,045
21,915,426
22,996,742
26,471,072
26,791,361
28,644,198
27,531,585
29,277,517
30,041,983
33,315,479
36,785,398
41,876,410
45,508,693

Expenditures
6,278,402
7,108,450
7,982,757
8,577,424
9,968,342
10,405,286
11,508,058
12,722,470
11,458,084
14,874,773
13,706,759
11,125,364
11,314,206
12,644,786
13,694,728
15,352,079
19,235,483
22,730,593
23,698,132
23,998,838
24,390,104
26,658,192
29,084,946
32,126,415
33,611,309
33,263,488
33,486,322
34,165,084
33,419,899
36,542,804
39,593,566
40,482,021
43,282,944

Compiled from the annual reports of the Postmaster General.
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Table III
The following table shows the cost of the star service in the
states and territories west of the Mississippi on June 30, 1878,
on July 1, 1878, and on June 30, 1879,
State

June 30,
1878

July 1,
1878

June 30,
1879

Increase from
July 1, 1878

Ark.

$ 180,158

$ 113,324

Cal.

391,361

218,432

436,853

218,421

Colo.

186,861

113,163

291,055

177,892

Kans.

183,144

136,471

169,069

32,598

La.

107,279

72,580

101,785

29,204

Nebr.

133,214

93,908

131,719

37,811

Nev.

179,851

104,014

182,822

78,808

Ore.

109,693

73,960

169,577

95,627

Texas

486,735

359,045

638,039

278,994

Arlz.

134,462

60,007

196,467

136,460

Dakota

137,380

101,602

168,173

66,571

Idaho

69,496

70,216

154,042

83,826

N.M.

141,794

52,937

223,529

170,592

Montana

153,138

65,964

136,327

70,390

Utah

301,570

196,502

224,016

27,514

50,782

39,081

37,316

*1,765

123,286

90,912

134,326

93,279

53.983

47.172

140.451

43.414

3,124,187

2,009,280

3,706,997

1,699,509

. Washington
Wyoming
Indian Ter.
Total
*

Decrease

$

171,431

$

58,107

-
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Table IV.
Estimates, appropriations, and cost of the inland transpor
tation of mail other than railway und r Thomas J. Brady.

1877

1878

1879

1880

$6,237,973

$7,090,673

$6,800,000

Appropriation $6,737,851

6,237,974

7,090,673

6,800,000

Cost

6,467,426

7,156,220

8,208,927

Estimate

6,658,006

Compiled from the annual reports of the Post Office Department.
Prior to 1879 the appropriation for and steamboat service was made
together so they are combined here.
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